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States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

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Termination <strong>of</strong> a state <strong>of</strong> emergency is <strong>of</strong> obvious importance, and<br />

the procedures <strong>for</strong> declaration usually determine how this occurs.<br />

Many constitutions additionally impose a positive duty on the<br />

institutional actor having the power <strong>of</strong> declaration to terminate a<br />

state <strong>of</strong> emergency ahead <strong>of</strong> its temporal expiry if the threat has<br />

abated or there is no legitimate reason why the state <strong>of</strong> emergency<br />

should continue.<br />

3.1.3
Legal
Effects
<strong>of</strong>
a
Declaration
<strong>of</strong>
<strong>Emergency</strong><br />

The legal effect and consequences <strong>of</strong> a declaration <strong>of</strong> a state <strong>of</strong><br />

emergency <strong>for</strong> the ordinary constitutional order, comprises the<br />

substantive crux <strong>of</strong> the matter in addressing the tension between<br />

emergency powers and democratic values. For constitutionmakers,<br />

the relevant questions are as follows: (a) Which elements<br />

<strong>of</strong> the normal constitutional order are affected, in whole or in part,<br />

or suspended (if at all) by the operation <strong>of</strong> the emergency regime<br />

(b) What fundamental rights constitutionally protected under<br />

normal circumstances can be limited or derogated from during an<br />

emergency, and to what extent (c) How does the institutional<br />

framework and balance <strong>of</strong> the constitutional order change (d)<br />

Are amendments to the constitution under emergency powers<br />

permitted, and if so to what extent 120<br />

In addressing these questions, the general pattern among liberal<br />

democratic constitutions shows that while derogations, within<br />

limits, <strong>of</strong> some fundamental rights as well as greater institutional<br />

space <strong>for</strong> the executive are permitted, a suspension <strong>of</strong> the<br />

constitution or empowering emergency‐related constitutional<br />

amendments are disapproved <strong>of</strong>, although emergency measures<br />

120<br />

See also Cheadle, Davis & Haysom (2002) op cit., Ch.31<br />

79

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