States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
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Termination <strong>of</strong> a state <strong>of</strong> emergency is <strong>of</strong> obvious importance, and<br />
the procedures <strong>for</strong> declaration usually determine how this occurs.<br />
Many constitutions additionally impose a positive duty on the<br />
institutional actor having the power <strong>of</strong> declaration to terminate a<br />
state <strong>of</strong> emergency ahead <strong>of</strong> its temporal expiry if the threat has<br />
abated or there is no legitimate reason why the state <strong>of</strong> emergency<br />
should continue.<br />
3.1.3 Legal Effects <strong>of</strong> a Declaration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Emergency</strong><br />
The legal effect and consequences <strong>of</strong> a declaration <strong>of</strong> a state <strong>of</strong><br />
emergency <strong>for</strong> the ordinary constitutional order, comprises the<br />
substantive crux <strong>of</strong> the matter in addressing the tension between<br />
emergency powers and democratic values. For constitutionmakers,<br />
the relevant questions are as follows: (a) Which elements<br />
<strong>of</strong> the normal constitutional order are affected, in whole or in part,<br />
or suspended (if at all) by the operation <strong>of</strong> the emergency regime<br />
(b) What fundamental rights constitutionally protected under<br />
normal circumstances can be limited or derogated from during an<br />
emergency, and to what extent (c) How does the institutional<br />
framework and balance <strong>of</strong> the constitutional order change (d)<br />
Are amendments to the constitution under emergency powers<br />
permitted, and if so to what extent 120<br />
In addressing these questions, the general pattern among liberal<br />
democratic constitutions shows that while derogations, within<br />
limits, <strong>of</strong> some fundamental rights as well as greater institutional<br />
space <strong>for</strong> the executive are permitted, a suspension <strong>of</strong> the<br />
constitution or empowering emergency‐related constitutional<br />
amendments are disapproved <strong>of</strong>, although emergency measures<br />
120<br />
See also Cheadle, Davis & Haysom (2002) op cit., Ch.31<br />
79