States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
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In the federal parliamentary system <strong>of</strong> India, the unusual<br />
constitutional distribution <strong>of</strong> power in respect <strong>of</strong> emergencies 112<br />
that gives pre‐eminence to the Union over states, places the<br />
President <strong>of</strong> India in a unique position. Under India’s<br />
parliamentary system, the President is a titular Ligure, but one <strong>of</strong><br />
his emergency powers is under certain circumstances to dissolve<br />
state governments and impose direct rule. The Indian President,<br />
however, can only act on the advice <strong>of</strong> the Prime Minister. 113<br />
The multilevel emergency regime in the Spanish constitution<br />
carries over into the function <strong>of</strong> declaration, whereby some types<br />
<strong>of</strong> emergency are declared by the executive and others by the<br />
legislature. Thus <strong>for</strong> example, the least serious state <strong>of</strong> alarm can<br />
be declared by the government with notice to the legislature, the<br />
next level state <strong>of</strong> emergency can be declared by the executive but<br />
with prior approval <strong>of</strong> the legislature, whereas the most serious<br />
state <strong>of</strong> siege can only be declared by the legislature on a motion<br />
by the government. 114<br />
Safeguards are also found in the <strong>for</strong>m <strong>of</strong> constitutionally stipulated<br />
legislative majorities to approve declarations as well as extensions<br />
<strong>of</strong> emergencies. These extend from simple majorities to special<br />
majorities that are required <strong>for</strong> certain types <strong>of</strong> emergencies and<br />
<strong>for</strong> their extension. 115 In his model <strong>of</strong> emergency powers,<br />
Ackerman proposes the device <strong>of</strong> ‘supra‐majority escalation’<br />
112<br />
See esp. H.M. Seervai (1996) Constitutional Law <strong>of</strong> India (4 th Ed.)<br />
(Bombay: Tripathi): Ch. XXIX; S.R. Bommai v. Union (1994) 3 SCC 1<br />
113<br />
Article 352 <strong>of</strong> the Indian Constitution<br />
114<br />
Articles 116 (2), (3), (4) <strong>of</strong> the Spanish Constitution<br />
115<br />
Articles 80a and 115a <strong>of</strong> the German Basic Law; Article 352 (6) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Indian Constitution<br />
77