States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

on devolution, 139 whereas opponents of extensive devolution have
strenuously held that such retention is essential to safeguard the
territorial integrity of the country against attempts at secession by
the North and East region. 140 By provisions introduced by the
Thirteenth Amendment, presidential emergency powers extend to
the issuing of orders and instructions to provincial Governors in
respect of actual or imminent public security threats 141 and
emergency regulations made by the President override provincial
statutes. 142 We shall revisit this issue later. 143
3.1.4
Checks
and
Balances
It is the challenge of democratic constitution‐makers to provide
for the exercise of power, particularly executive power that
facilitates strong and efLicient government, whilst ensuring at the
same time safeguards against abuse. This problem applies a
fortiori to the design of arrangements for states of emergency. The
139
Neelan Tiruchelvam, ‘The
Politics
of
Federalism
and
Diversity
in
Sri
Lanka’ in Yash Ghai (Ed.) (2000) Autonomy
and
Ethnicity:
Negotiating
Competing
Claims
in
Multi‐ethnic
States
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP):
Ch.9; Rohan Edrisinha & Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, ‘The
Case
for
a
Federal
Sri
Lanka’ in Rohan Edrisinha & Jayadeva Uyangoda (Eds.) Essays
on
Constitutional
Reform
(Colombo: CEPRA)
140
H.L. de Silva P.C., Professor G.H. Peiris, Gomin Dayasiri & Manohara de
Silva P.C. (2006) Interim Report of Sub‐Committee B of the Experts Panel
of the All Party Representative Committee, 11 th December 2006
141
Article 154J (1) of the constitution. See also Articles 154K (failure of
provincial Governors to comply with presidential directions) and 154L
(failure of the administrative machinery of a Province)
142
Article 155 (3A)
143
Chapter 5, infra
87