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States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

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outcome in concrete cases between times <strong>of</strong> crisis and normality.<br />

It is perfectionist in the sense that it presumes that the<br />

constitution anticipates every conceivable challenge, including<br />

those presented by an emergency.<br />

Finally, the ‘extra‐legal measures’ models are those that are<br />

prepared to contemplate extra‐legal or even extra‐constitutional<br />

action during times <strong>of</strong> crisis. Gross and Ní Aoláin discuss several<br />

sources <strong>of</strong> the extra‐legal model, some <strong>of</strong> which have respectable<br />

ethical, moral and political foundations. Indeed, in one view <strong>of</strong> the<br />

British concept <strong>of</strong> martial law, actions during times <strong>of</strong> emergency<br />

could be entirely outside the ordinary legal system but yet be<br />

justiLied by the necessity and nature <strong>of</strong> the power used. However,<br />

<strong>for</strong> reasons already canvassed in the previous chapter, we focus on<br />

the theoretical challenge to liberal constitutionalism posed by Carl<br />

Schmitt in his theory <strong>of</strong> emergency powers.<br />

2.1
Models
<strong>of</strong>
Accommodation<br />

The groups <strong>of</strong> models represented by the models <strong>of</strong><br />

accommodation are those that have dominated the discourse<br />

regarding the treatment <strong>of</strong> emergency powers in democratic<br />

regimes. These are concerned with addressing the tension<br />

between emergency powers and democratic values. More<br />

speciLically, these models, with varying institutional mechanisms<br />

and degrees <strong>of</strong> equilibrium, seek to strike a balance between the<br />

recognition <strong>of</strong> the need <strong>for</strong> extraordinary powers during times <strong>of</strong><br />

crisis and the need to preserve the democratic core <strong>of</strong> the<br />

constitutional order. They are there<strong>for</strong>e essentially about an<br />

appropriate trade‐<strong>of</strong>f between the competing values <strong>of</strong> order and<br />

liberty. The overarching objective <strong>of</strong> emergency powers is the<br />

preservation <strong>of</strong> the constitutional order in a manner that does not,<br />

32

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