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Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

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THE CASE FOR CHANGE<br />

● To identify specific cases upon which it requires a full report from <strong>the</strong> Commissioner,<br />

and <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong>se to include live as well as closed cases.<br />

● To give advice or views on <strong>the</strong> conduct or progress <strong>of</strong> a specific case to which <strong>the</strong><br />

Commissioner should be required to have regard; to nominate one or more<br />

Members to give such advice or views on a continuing basis throughout <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong><br />

an individual case.<br />

● To set standards in respect <strong>of</strong> matters such as use <strong>of</strong> mediation, in<strong>for</strong>mal resolution <strong>of</strong><br />

complaints, and restorative conferencing to which <strong>the</strong> Commissioner should be<br />

required to have regard.”<br />

(Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MPA’s Pr<strong>of</strong>essional Standards and<br />

Complaints Committee.)<br />

6.27 Lord Harris proposed in his submission that <strong>the</strong> function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> complaints within a service should be at “arms length” from <strong>the</strong> service<br />

management and directly accountable to <strong>the</strong> police authority. “Redefining <strong>the</strong><br />

relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investigating unit to <strong>the</strong> Authority could boost community confidence in <strong>the</strong><br />

complaints process, complementing <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MPA.”<br />

6.28 <strong>The</strong> MPA itself acknowledged that this proposal received little support from<br />

those giving evidence to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Inquiry</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Commissioner saw it as potentially being<br />

“political interference”, although <strong>the</strong> MPA, like all police authorities, is not intended to<br />

be a political body. <strong>The</strong> MPA clarified that <strong>the</strong>y were not proposing that police<br />

authorities should have any direct responsibility <strong>for</strong> discipline decisions or functions<br />

and saw <strong>the</strong> proposal as building on <strong>the</strong> “existing convention in police <strong>for</strong>ces that <strong>the</strong><br />

Deputy Chief Constable is <strong>the</strong> discipline authority and responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

complaints function.”<br />

6.29 Thus, in respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MPS, <strong>the</strong> MPA’s proposal is that <strong>the</strong> Deputy<br />

Commissioner should have responsibility and accountability <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction and<br />

control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> service relating to <strong>the</strong> investigation <strong>of</strong> complaints and conduct<br />

matters and should report to, and be accountable, to <strong>the</strong> Authority <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

per<strong>for</strong>mance <strong>of</strong> those responsibilities.<br />

6.30 This would leave <strong>the</strong> Commissioner free in <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> final adjudicator on<br />

individual cases without a conflict <strong>of</strong> responsibilities.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> functions, and <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> authority as an independent player,<br />

would serve to increase public and internal confidence in <strong>the</strong> system.”<br />

(Submission from Reshard Auladin, Chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MPA’s Pr<strong>of</strong>essional Standards and<br />

Complaints Committee.)<br />

6.31 We invited <strong>the</strong> Home Office to comment on <strong>the</strong> MPA’s proposal. <strong>The</strong> department’s<br />

view is that <strong>the</strong> current statutory framework enables police authorities to carry out <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

oversight responsibilities and that authorities play a valuable role in asking challenging<br />

questions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> service. In <strong>the</strong>ir submission to us, <strong>the</strong> Home Office noted <strong>the</strong> MPA’s<br />

view that <strong>the</strong>re was a case <strong>for</strong> “fundamental structural re<strong>for</strong>m to put <strong>the</strong> investigation <strong>of</strong><br />

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