Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
● 18 September 2001
Superintendent Dizaei re-arrested by appointment and
interviewed.
● 31 May 2002
Superintendent Dizaei issued defamation proceedings
against named officers in the MPS.
● 17 March 2003
Superintendent Dizaei stood trial at the Central
Criminal Court.
● 11 April 2003
Superintendent Dizaei acquitted.
words of advice for the two counts of misconduct
which he admitted, his secondment to the NBPA with
promotion to Chief Superintendent in due course, his
attendance on the Strategic Command Course, an
agreement that he would amend his Employment
Tribunal claim to omit reference to Operation Helios,
that he would not pursue his defamation claim or any
private prosecutions or personal complaints, payment
of a sum of money to him, a withdrawal by the NBPA
of complaints against named senior officers and a
public acknowledgment that it was no longer
discouraging recruits from ethnic minority
backgrounds from applying to the MPS and that it
would re-route its march to avoid New Scotland Yard.
● September 2003
CPS decided that no further charges should be
preferred against Superintendent Dizaei.
● March 2004
PCA directed that the MPS should take disciplinary
action against Superintendent Dizaei.
● 16 September 2003
The NBPA boycotted the MPS recruitment drives and
announced a ‘march of solidarity’ on Scotland Yard to
be held in November 2003.
● 24 October 2003
Settlement agreement, which provided for the return
to duty of Superintendent Dizaei with him receiving
● 1 April 2004
MPS requested that the IPCC review the PCA’s
direction to prefer disciplinary charges.
● 16 June 2004
IPCC decided to reverse the PCA’s decision.
How the case was handled
10.17 A variety of witnesses have been critical of the way in which Operation
Helios was handled. We also received evidence from the MPS and have considered
all the evidence carefully in reaching our conclusions. We do not repeat here all of
the criticisms of the investigation which we received but only outline those
criticisms with which we agree.
10.18 As with the other high profile cases, many of the issues which in our view
merit criticism are generic and apply to other cases we have examined.
The investigation process
10.19 We have previously identified what we consider to be weaknesses in the way
DPS conducts investigations. We think these weaknesses are evident in relation to
Operation Helios, where we consider there to have been a fundamental lack of
strategic grasp of the investigation and a failure to step back from it, during its
course, and objectively assess the evidence that had been gathered.
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