Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1.29 The Independent Advisory Group (IAG) plays a vital role in scrutinising the
work of the MPS and holding it to account on behalf of Londoners. We examined
this role, particularly in relation to its recent involvement in investigations of officers.
1.30 We were extremely impressed by the IAG members who gave evidence to us
and found them to be people of great integrity. However, we are clear that IAG
members are holders of public office which requires the highest degree of
transparency. We consider that the ‘Nolan Principles’ should apply to their
appointment, which should be made by the MPA. This, together with the proper
resourcing of the group, will enhance their credibility even further.
1.31 In this area of our work, we were concerned about the use of lay advisors by
the MPS in relation to the case involving Superintendent Dizaei (Operation Helios)
and have made a specific recommendation about the rules we believe should
govern access by independent and lay advisors to documentation and the rationale
for decisions.
Professional Standards
1.32 By far the largest topic we were asked to consider was how the MPS handles
matters of professional standards. This is the area where we have made the most
recommendations.
1.33 If our earlier recommendations on the extension of employment law rights to
officers and the replacement of the current regulatory regime for complaints and
discipline are accepted, most of what we say in this part of our report will be
superseded. However, we believe that there is much the MPS can do to improve
the way it handles cases in the interim while the current regime continues to apply.
Essentially our recommendations can be divided into two.
1.34 Firstly, we are concerned about how the Directorate of Professional Standards
actually manages investigations and whether senior managers are really held to
account for the manner in which investigations are conducted. We received a
significant amount of evidence which pointed to problems with the system in
respect of delays, the use of suspension, the treatment of individuals and the actual
conduct of investigations.
1.35 We are, therefore, recommending that the Commissioner personally oversees
a fundamental review of the way the directorate operates. This should include
consideration of how officers are appointed to the directorate, since we believe that
regular injections of new ideas and fresh thinking will challenge the prevailing
culture within the directorate and ensure it does not become stagnant and insular.
1.36 Secondly, we have made a number of recommendations which we consider
will address some of the concerns offered to us about the manner in which
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