Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

THE CASE FOR CHANGE
10.20 Superintendent Dizaei comments on a failure of leadership in relation to the
Operation in his submission: “What was clearly taking place was a steam train on its way
with no one able to stop the SIO placing more coal in the furnace. There was no U turn and
Helios had to continue with more surveillance and more resources. There was no leadership
capable of intervention.”
10.21 The decision of the IPCC makes this point clearly:
“The delay has been caused largely by the extent to which in this case it seems to us the
criminal inquiries came to dominate the handling of the case inappropriately, with no clear
overall strategic grasp of the case at senior level in the MPS evident.
“The disproportionate resources given to the covert surveillance of Supt Dizaei and the many
lines of investigation that were pursued to no avail have in our view been a contributory
factor in the excessive delays that compromise this case as an example of justice throughout
its history. The lessons and recommendations from the Lancet enquiry appear relevant here.
“We consider that several of the misconduct allegations could and should have been
investigated as such and prosecuted as such a good time ago, instead of which some of
them were put inappropriately into a criminal case that was then abandoned late in the day,
and others apparently left in the sidings until all of the criminal matters had been pursued.
We consider this to be a typical weakness of the police complaints and misconduct system,
reflecting the manner in which too many complaints and misconduct allegations against police
officers fail to progress timeously.”
10.22 In response to the criticism of a lack of strategic grasp of the investigation,
the MPS strongly disputes that this was the case. It contends that “the evidence
shows that the Helios investigation was in fact subject to an unprecedented level of strategic
management and external supervision.” It points to the involvement of the Surveillance
Commissioner, the Lay Advisors Group (LAG), the MPA, the CPS, the PCA and the
trial judge, the Recorder of London. (The Recorder refused Superintendent Dizaei’s
application to have the prosecution stayed on the grounds that it was an ‘abuse of
process’.)
10.23 We accept that all of these individuals and bodies had an involvement in the
case but we do not accept that their involvement constituted strategic
management of the investigation, nor do we accept that it was their role to
exercise this function. Ultimate responsibility for decision-making in an investigation
lies with the MPS. This cannot be abdicated in favour of outside bodies.
10.24 The independent investigators considered that DPS pursued allegations that
were difficult to prove in a way that resulted in allegations that were capable of
proof being sidelined:
“More important was the fact that the SIO had good evidence to either arrest or at the very
least discipline Superintendent Dizaei in respect of the telephone calls to his former girlfriend
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