Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

THE CASE FOR CHANGE
10.52 Representatives of the LAG have commented that: “The Helios LAG was
composed of individuals drawn from different professional backgrounds, faith, ethnic and
cultural groups, all of whom gave their time voluntarily and exercised their views
independently … Individual members shared a common view throughout our work on Helios.”
10.53 We do not seek to criticise either the individual Lay Advisors themselves
or the work of the LAG. Our concern, as set out above, is how the MPS treated
the Lay Advisors by not providing them with all the relevant information and
documents.
10.54 Similar considerations apply to the use of other external advisors, who need
to be given a full account of all relevant information and have their advice
considered constructively.
“ACU (the Anti Corruption Unit) also sought the advice of [redacted], a Deputy Chief
Constable, and yet failed to inform [redacted] that others members of the NBPA were being
investigated. More importantly the DCC (from whom advice had been sought) specifically
recommended that the mileage allegations should not be subject of discipline (due the
triviality and age of the claims) let alone a criminal trial. Yet that advice was wholly ignored.
Cherry picking of bits and pieces of advice from ‘advisors’ to fit a prescribed agenda is
contrary to common sense, disingenuous and abuse of the role of advisors. However, the MPA
were quick to argue that because a DCC had quality assured the investigation and conduct of
the officers, they as a police authority did not need to address our complaint.”
(Submission of the NBPA.)
Settlement Agreement
10.55 The IPCC strongly criticised the MPS’ decision to enter into a settlement
agreement with Superintendent Dizaei in the way that it did:
“We have also considered the agreement between the MPS and others dated 24 October
2004 [sic – should be 2003] and referred to above. The agreement sets out the terms to
facilitate the reinstatement of Supt Dizaei within the MPS. As noted, this agreement is ultra
vires and does not bind the PCA or the IPCC insofar as parts of the agreement relate to the
termination of misconduct proceedings against Supt Dizaei, a point conceded by the MPS.
Whilst we note that the MPS has withdrawn the undertaking rashly given to Mr Dizaei’s
solicitors to offer no evidence at any misconduct tribunal, we are of the view that it can now
be argued to be unfair to Supt Dizaei to proceed with a hearing. Mr Dizaei entered into the
agreement with the benefit of legal advice, and he can, not unreasonably, seek to rely on the
undertaking he was given by the MPS. In any other employment context such an agreement
would stand. We have to weigh the public interest in upholding the special powers accorded
the PCA/IPCC under the police disciplinary system with the application of the principles of
justice applicable in any such individual case. As noted above, we consider subordinating the
latter to the former risks frustrating the very objective sought.
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