Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

THE CASE FOR CHANGE
notices was a reaction to legal advice that there was insufficient evidence to proceed on
criminal matters and that consequently the MPS were resorting to discipline matters. The
situation was far from ideal.” (Independent investigators’ report.)
10.31 In addition, Superintendent Dizaei told us in his submission that: “My lawyers
who have represented superintendents for many years were astonished in the way the
investigation was unfolding. It seemed to them and others that there was no coordination, no
aim but a series of seat of the pants decisions based on no rational [sic] or logic.”
10.32 We think this lack of co-ordination led to an unfocused and disproportionate
investigation, where the MPS concentrated on minutiae that were unlikely to take
the matter much further and seemingly put evidence of greater strength on a back
burner.
10.33 In response to this criticism, the MPS cites problems with the legislative
framework for police discipline, in particular section 75 (3) Police Act 1996. This
section has now been replaced but it is still the case that, if a criminal offence may
have been committed, no misconduct process can take place until the Director of
Public Prosecutions has considered the criminal aspects.
10.34 We accept that this represents the legal position but consider that the lack of
co-ordination led to efforts being directed at attempting to find evidence to
support a criminal case, as opposed to simply moving ahead with conduct
proceedings. We are not alone in our view and cite again the views of the IPCC
Review Panel:
“We consider that several of the misconduct allegations could and should have been
investigated as such and prosecuted as such a good time ago, instead of which some of them
were put inappropriately into a criminal case that was then abandoned late in the day, and
others apparently left in the sidings until all of the criminal matters had been pursued.”
10.35 The MPS has told us that what emerges from consideration of Operation
Helios is that: “those who have had the widest extent of exposure to the case, with the
obvious exception of Superintendent Dizaei, appear to be most satisfied as to proportionality
and those who have not had such access, appear less satisfied. In the end the MPS accepts, and
has always accepted, that mistakes will have been made but would rely on the fact that the
most detailed scrutiny of this case occurred during the trial … after four weeks of voir dire
presented by one of the finest defence advocates of the criminal bar, the Recorder of London
specifically and wholly rejected defence submissions that the investigation had been
characterised by bad faith and disproportionality.”
10.36 We have considered the text of the Recorder’s judgment in which he
concludes: “I do not find that there was any element at all of bad faith. Nor do I find despite
some minor errors that there was anything approaching serious fault amounting to gross
negligence in the course of the operation.”
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