Final Report of the Morris Inquiry: The Case for Change

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
and her family. Throughout the remainder of 2000 up until the point when Superintendent
Dizaei was suspended from duty the PSI continued to be authorised. The review has
examined various documents covering this period of time and in summary the quality of the
evidence obtained could best be described as limited and as such the continued justification
for this facility is questionable.”
10.25 We refer below to our concerns about the way in which the MPS used the
LAG in this investigation. It is worth noting here, however, that the MBPA attributes
failings in this respect to the lack of strategic grasp of the investigation which we
have identified more generally:
“We believe that many of the decisions that were made and actioned during this investigation
can only be explained by reference to the fact that no one of sufficient seniority or
independence was carrying out the necessary checks and balances required in order to
prevent what we consider to have been a serious manipulation of the original IAG concept.”
(Submission from the MBPA.)
10.26 The MPS has pointed out that, in addition to the surveillance reviews,
management reviews were conducted by a number of very senior officers and that
the evidence does not support that those senior officers abdicated responsibility for
intervening in the case.
10.27 Notwithstanding this, our overall impression of the investigation from the
evidence we have seen has led us to concur with the views of the IPCC in this respect.
10.28 This lack of co-ordination of the investigation is, we consider, exemplified by
the sequential way in which formal notices of alleged misconduct (Regulation 9
Notices) were served on Superintendent Dizaei:
“On the 18 January 2001 when Superintendent Dizaei was suspended he was served with a
Regulation 9 Notice, which gave general details of eleven allegations, which were under
investigation. Over the following months there were a further five occasions when regulation 9
notices were served although it was not until the 10 and 11 July 2001 that Superintendent
Dizaei was interviewed about any of the allegations.” (Independent Investigator’s report.)
10.29 The MPS has commented that Regulation 9 Notices were served on
Superintendent Dizaei at times and locations convenient to him to minimise
potential distress. It also contends that one delay in serving some Regulation 9
Notices in 2001 was “due to intelligence being turned into evidence once the investigation
became overt … It needed that 6 months to develop the intelligence.The investigation
wanted to avoid unnecessary service of Regulation 9 notices until the picture was clearer.”
10.30 Our investigators’ conclusions are somewhat different:
“What this staged service has left the MPS open to is the allegation that it was designed to
inflict the most stress and anxiety on Superintendent Dizaei. Similarly that the service of the
241