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3720 - Board of Claims

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Paving undertook to negotiate the movement <strong>of</strong> the utility (i.e. water main). Even though the<br />

contract stated that the contractor had the responsibility to deal with the city to relocate the main,<br />

the court found that, by its acts, PennDOT assumed responsibility for the relocation and<br />

“relieved” the contractor <strong>of</strong> any duty to negotiate. The court found PennDOT liable for the three<br />

months <strong>of</strong> delay expense because PennDOT knew <strong>of</strong> the obstructing water main and did not act<br />

more “expeditiously” in negotiating the relocation after “assuming responsibility for the<br />

negotiations.” As a result, the court found PennDOT “directly interfered” with the contractor “in<br />

a way that was not within either party’s contemplation at the time the contract was signed.” Id.<br />

at 141. The exculpatory clauses were found to be no shield to liability or damages. 18<br />

In fact, the <strong>Board</strong> finds the circumstances and PennDOT's conduct in the case at hand to<br />

be even more egregious than in Coatesville or General Asphalt because, after making his<br />

representations at the pre-job meeting regarding utility pole relocation, Mr. Pilosi then did<br />

nothing for the next six months to follow through on his promises. Mr. Pilosi's representations<br />

that he would handle problems with pole relocation with the Utilities, Mr. Sebastianelli's<br />

assurances <strong>of</strong> same during the many months that Intercounty requested such assistance from<br />

PennDOT, and Mr. Pilosi's deliberate decision to do nothing with this problem, particularly from<br />

18 Other jurisdictions also refuse to enforce exculpatory provisions in similar circumstances. For example, Nello L.<br />

Teer Company v. North Carolina Department <strong>of</strong> Transportation, 2004 WL 5218006 (N.C. Super. 2004) is another<br />

case with facts similar to the case at bar. In Teer, the North Carolina Department <strong>of</strong> Transportation (“Department”)<br />

drafted a contract for a road widening project that required the contractor to rebuild the road using four set phases <strong>of</strong><br />

construction. Three utilities needed to relocate their poles before construction could begin in accordance with the<br />

construction phases. The Department directed the contractor to begin the project even though the utilities had not<br />

relocated any poles and then ordered the contractor to keep working even though it took 18 months for the utilities<br />

to complete their work. The Department ignored the contractor’s requests for a time extension and insisted the<br />

contractor keep working while the Department made continuing revisions to the construction sequence. The court<br />

found that the Department had the duty through its own State Utility Agent to make every effort to expedite the pole<br />

relocations. It held the Department liable because the contactor was denied access to the work site as contemplated<br />

in the contract and had to work pursuant to the changed schedule and not as planned. It found that the contract<br />

implied that the site would be accessible to the contractor and the parties did not anticipate that the contractor would<br />

have to work with poles in place. The court refused to enforce the contract’s exculpatory clauses because the<br />

Department denied the contractor unhindered access to the work and found the Department liable for delay and<br />

disruption damages.<br />

89

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