The Canadian Army Journal

into Belgium, General Charles Foulkes’ 2nd Canadian Division headed for Dunkirk. Due
to the diversion of supplies and reinforcements for Market-Garden, Canadian units found
themselves stretched to the limit, and 2nd Canadian Division could not tackle the 20,000
strong Dunkirk garrison alone. Suffering from acute shortages of artillery ammunition
and petrol, Foulkes ordered a cordon sanitiaire be established around the port tasking
his battalions to “contain” and “patrol” the perimeter. 3 With Dunkirk last on the list for
liberation, “plenty of containing” was on tap and the prospect of sitting and watching the
Germans did not appeal to some who “were beginning to get restless.” 4 For the Black
Watch, the seemingly mundane role in this process commenced with the occupation of
the tiny hamlet of Grande Mille Brugge on the Colme canal.
“Why this place rates the title ‘GRANDE’ Mille Brugge is hard to imagine” the wry
witted Black Watch war diarist noted on September 9th , “as it is nothing more…than a row
of small houses on either side of the canal.” 5 Indeed, the terrain surrounding the hamlet
was anything but inviting. With the dykes running along the canal blown in numerous
areas by retreating Germans, it was fortunate that the Black Watch did not have to dig
in “on the fly” as the majority of the adjacent fields were under water; leaving only a brick
works and a few fieldstone buildings strung along the canal for cover. 6
Shortly after establishing Battalion headquarters in the ovens of the local brick
works on the morning of the 9th , German shells began to land. 7 Consisting at first of the
traditional sprinkling of mortar and 88 mm fire the cover afforded by the structures along
the canal kept casualties “amazingly low.” 8 This changed over the next few days when
105 and 150 mm guns joined the fray taking a heavy toll on battalion transport. 9 The
situation moved from bad to worse when the defenders of Dunkirk turned their giant
coastal rail guns landward onto Black Watch positions. “The shells sounded like freight
trains as they descended” recalled Nixon; and life in Grand Mille Brugge became less
than comfortable as casualties mounted. 10 The proportion of casualties to the amount of
shelling was still “unduly low,” but as the war diarist from the 18th Canadian Field
Ambulance recorded, the “luckless individuals who got in the way of fragments from
these shells were either killed of suffered particularly severe wounds with a very poor
prognosis.” In a period of two days, over 50 men were lost—including Nixon’s veteran
scout platoon sergeant Barney Benson who survived the massacre at Verrieres Ridge
six weeks earlier. Benson, who had shown the young platoon commander the ropes,
broke from cover to respond to the cries of a wounded comrade, and was nearly cut in
half by the splinters of a coastal gun shell. 11 Although loaded on an ambulance Jeep and
rushed to the Regimental Aid Post, the “completely fearless” and inspirational scout bled
out en route leaving a lasting void within the battalion. 12 In addition to the shelling,
intense patrol activity and sniping characterized the five-day stay at Grande Mille Brugge
with fatigue taking its toll on morale as men remained on alert for German probes that
failed to materialize. Unlike other garrisons encountered, such as that at Coppenaxfort
where 250 Germans surrendered after a brief fight to Major E. Pinkham’s C Company
on the 9th , the mixed bag of Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, and SS troops in
Dunkirk proved more aggressive than previously encountered. 13 As a result, continual
“punching and jabbing” in the towns around Grande Mille Brugge began with German
patrols infiltrating by night to lay minefields that severed communications between
battalion and brigade headquarters. 14 In addition, they jammed radio communications,
cut or booby trapped phone lines, and ambushed repair parties. For the most part,
however, morale in the Black Watch was beginning to waiver as the men became
increasingly “fed up of the monotony” and the “somewhat depressing business.” 15
Inundations of the fields surrounding Dunkirk restricted movement to roads and
raised areas, and limited the options for an approaching army. As such, the Germans
adopted a policy of holding towns and villages outside of the coastal fortress to slow and
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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