The Canadian Army Journal

these concerns. This effort includes the publication of white papers on defence, greater
foreign access to military publications in China, and meetings between Western scholars
and Chinese military. The result has been a flood of academic research on various
aspects of the Chinese military that is truly enlightening.
Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China is the result of a conference sponsored by
The CNA Corporation in May 2004. The avowed purpose of the gathering was to
examine the impact of China’s economic success on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and identify the challenges it faces to support China’s growing clout on the international
scene. The picture that emerges is mixed in that the PLA is indeed facing major
challenges, but it will become a formidable force should it succeed.
Professor Tony Saich of Harvard University and Xiaobing Li, a former PLA officer
and currently a professor at the University of Central Oklahoma individually outline the
challenges that the surrounding society presents to the PLA. Professor Saich identifies
two major factors that have shaped the reform agenda of the PLA: modernization and
professionalization. On the one hand, modernization of the larger society has attracted
many human resources away from the state and the military toward the more promising
economic sector with its higher wages and other benefits. This development in turn has
created recruiting problems for the PLA. Greater urbanization has made it difficult as well
to recruit soldiers for rural areas. The aging population is also creating challenges in the
area of budget allocation. Failure to address the needs of this group (retirement benefits
and health care) could lead to civil unrest. Professionalization, the top priority for the
PLA, will also challenge Chinese leaders to attract a pool of better qualified soldiers to
man increasingly sophisticated equipment.
Professor Li addresses similar concerns but from a different angle. According to
him, the growth of a modern liberal economy in China has had important effects on
individual mindsets. Chinese recruits tend to be more individualists, less inclined to
follow orders blindly, and are more career minded than patriotic, among other
developments. These issues will challenge Chinese leaders to develop a loyal military.
Professor Cheng Li looks at the top military officers and finds that they are more
professional than earlier generations, better educated, and substantially younger. On the
other hand, they lack war experience, and nepotism and favoritism are still prevalent.
Again these developments will present the Chinese leadership with major challenges.
Yu Bin, a political scientist, focuses on the relations between political and military
leaders. He finds that the situation has stabilized considerably since the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976). Ironically, while the current political leaders have virtually no
military experience, they have been particularly active in pushing for greater
professionalization of the military—understood in part as less involvement in politics.
This development is contributing to greater consultation between both sides.
If the discussion has generally been about the top of the structure, Professor Bo
Zhiyue turned his attention to the impact of military reforms at the local level. His study
reveals that much work has been put into the coordination of the political and military
levers at this level. This work includes addressing the difficult demobilization of
thousands of soldiers—1.7 million between 1985 and 2010. There is also the issue of the
dual functions of regional airports, harbours and other real estate. If progress has been
noted, the major challenge remains the institutionalization of the civil-military structure
that has been put into place to improve coordination between civilian and military
authorities.
As indicated above, professionalization of the Chinese military has been one of the
top priorities of the government. During the Maoist period (1949-1976), being “red”
(politically aware) was more important than being “expert” (professional). High
technology played little role in Chinese military thinking. Chairman Mao relied on the
130 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008