The Canadian Army Journal

the engagement of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright, Alberta.
This facility is used as final training venue for high readiness Land Force units and
employs a real time, free play enemy along with actors simulating other government
agencies and civilians on the battlefield. As a minimum, MPFs should be modeled and
represented on the battlefield for the training purposes of the unit preparing to deploy.
More specifically, an MPF could be contracted to provide those defensive tasks
described earlier within an exercise scenario to examine the concept and determine
what the advantages, disadvantages and limitations would be for the CF in a situation
where lives would not be on the line. Also, whether the employment of MPFs can be
rationalized to provide a whole of government approach for their use, rather than the
fractured approach that occurs in the US between the State Department and the
Pentagon, would be useful to examine.
Finally, this paper did not delve into the moral or ethical implications surrounding the
employment of MPFs. It will be left to others to argue the merits or demerits of their use
by states and other organizations. However, further research into these moral and
ethical implications would be useful in analyzing the question in all of its facets, including
the impact on the military as a profession. How does this contracting of force affect the
status of the military as a profession and the soldier/officer as a professional? Also,
where would the employment of MPFs fit within the context of Canadian society and
what would Canadians accept in the delivery of defence of their nation? Answers to
these questions would shed some light on where the issue goes in the future, potentially
leading to some sort of industry regulation in Canada.
In the final analysis, however, it is clear that the CF can no longer ignore the
employment of MPFs on the battlefield. They are now part of the increasingly complex
contemporary operating environment, along with non-governmental organizations, nonstate
actors, insurgents, transnational corporations, and finally, traditional state military
organizations. The CF will need to learn how to work with them, beside them or even
employ them. The analysis in this paper has demonstrated that they are a “tool in the
toolbox” that can be used as a potential solution to the chronic problems facing the
Canadian military. Unlike the quote from the Chief of the Land Staff at the start of this
examination, the CF will not, for the foreseeable future, be in a position to reject out of
hand this potential solution.
About the Author ...
Major Shane Gifford is an armoured officer who has served with CCUNPROFOR HQ (Croatia)
Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) Battle Group (Bosnia), and most recently in Bosnia
again as OC C Sqn, 2 PPCLI Battle Group in 2003. He has completed a Bachelor of Social
Sciences degree and a Master of Defence Studies degree. He recently completed the Joint
Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Forces College and is currently serving as G33
International Current Operations at LSHQ. This article is an abridged version of his thesis on the
use of armed contractors, written for his Master’s in Defence Studies.
Endnotes
1. Murray Brewster, “A Canadian Force Trained by Civilians,” The Chronicle Herald, 2 November 2006, available from
http://thechronicleherald.ca/Canada/542203.html; Internet; accessed 21 December 2006.
2. Ibid.
3. Sarah Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, Adelphi Paper 384 (New York: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Oxford University Press, 2006), 7.
4. Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (New York:
Rutledge Press, 2006), 94.
5. Gerald Schumacher, A Bloody Business: America’s War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq (St. Paul, MN:
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