The Canadian Army Journal

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By 1996, the movement had evicted other factions from Kabul; in 1998 they gained
control of Mazar-e-sharif and were the de facto rulers of the country. 16 Initially, the
population was cautiously optimistic—the Taliban had managed to end the lawlessness
and “enjoyed…popularity as a reform movement.” 17 In fact, this spirit of optimism was
not limited to Afghanistan, and international observers can also be characterized as
sharing the hope of the Afghan people with regard to the ultimate effect of the Taliban’s
rapid rise to power. 18 Sadly, once in power the Taliban revealed the true nature of their
regime.
Using a structure that one author characterized as being similar, ironically, to that of
the “Roman Catholic Church,” 19 where Mullah Omar was viewed as “infallible,” 20 the
Taliban began the radical process of implementing Islamic law (sharia) on a national
scale, reflecting the worldview of Omar himself and his own “understanding of Islamic
precepts of government.” 21 This process has been described as “an attempt to go back
in time,” to a “world of simple truths that resembled Islam in the seventh century.” 22
Almost overnight, the rules of social conduct changed, with women being barred from
educational opportunities and even healthcare, men being expected to grow full beards
and adopt traditional dress, and “any social mingling or communication among men and
women outside the family” being forbidden. 23 This had the effect of earning world-wide
shock and disproval, to the extent that the regime was only recognized by Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. 24
For five years, the regime lead by Omar ruled Afghanistan and ultimately sowed the
seeds of its own demise when they accepted Osama Bin Laden on their soil. In the wake
of 9/11 they refused to hand him over to American authorities. 25 Within two months of
the attacks in New York, the American military began working with other groups in
Afghanistan. The Americans relied upon a pairing of “Special Forces teams and
airpower with local commanders and militias.” 26 While devastating against the Taliban,
this arrangement would also have unanticipated consequences when it came time to
decide who had won the war—the Americans or the warlords that they were working
with. 27
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
Combat Camera AR2008-Z135-05