The Canadian Army Journal

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type of deployment is likely the shape of things to come for future CF endeavours as
stresses on manpower will be the norm.
This section has examined the path of privatization within western militaries since
the Cold War. The first was the provision of logistics services and the engagement of
MSFs. An examination of CANCAP shows that this contracting arrangement is likely
permanent and that the CF could not likely support extended deployments abroad
without contracted logistics support, despite the fact that conditions in current theatres
like Afghanistan are not like those for which the programme was originally intended.
Next, the move of MCFs into an area that western militaries once considered a “core”
function was detailed, along with current Canadian examples of the NFTC program and
the recent contracting of some basic occupation training within the Canadian Land
Force. It is clear from this that Canada has mirrored the experiences of the other
western nations up to the point of employing MPFs in support of CF operations. The
experience of the US in Iraq and the experience of these companies indicate that they
are primarily employed in defensive tasks, filling the void caused by a lack of soldiers.
The CF must be prepared to examine its options with regard to the use of MPFs.
Canada and its military leaders should see the employment of MPFs as the next logical
step in the privatization of military force, and be prepared to use these firms to assist the
CF accomplish its missions and to ameliorate the stresses on the military.
The Current Legal Climate
The legal status of military contractors on the battlefield has become increasingly
complicated. Sarah Percy in her Adelphi paper has stated that “if there is a regulatory
vacuum regarding PSCs, it exists under current international law.” 48 Other
commentators, such as Caroline Holmqvist of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute echo this view on the international state of law and regulation, but
hold out little hope for any action in the short term that would clarify the situation. She
points out that the two most cited pieces of international legal documentation are not
applicable or do not address the contemporary private military company. These legal
documents are Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and the
African Union Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism. Holmqvist, among others,
points out that private military industries are ultimately not subject to these protocols as
they do not meet the six conditions for being classified as mercenaries. 49 Indeed, these
protocols have made it easy for mercenaries, and not just private military companies, to
avoid meeting the criteria of the definitions and prosecution. 50 Neither Percy nor
Holmqvist hold out hope for any significant change in this legal vacuum in the near
future. It is pointed out that it took almost 12 years to get the UN document ratified by
the minimum 22 nations and that none of the major western countries are signatories. 51
Additionally, the inability of the international community to establish the legal status of
private military companies has led some commentators to believe that only national level
legislation or regulation will be effective, especially since national legislation does not
require international negotiation, or the requirement to accept the lowest common
denominator in order to reach agreement. 52
Caroline Holmqvist sees two reasons for addressing the regulation of MPFs through
national legislation. The first is that regulation by the state affirms their place in the
venue of international security relations. The second reason is that she believes that it
is at the national level that regulation stands the best chance of success. 53 Amongst the
western nations, the US and the United Kingdom (UK) provide two good examples of the
state of domestic regulation of the industry, particularly since many of the major PMCs
are headquartered in these two countries.
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008