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Chapter Four ends with the death of the Chilean hero, Arturo Prat, and the destruction
of some 40% of the Allies’ offensive naval power. Chapter Five details the Peruvian
efforts, under the leadership of their naval hero, Miguel Grau, to hold off the superior
Chilean navy under the command of its ambitious, lethargic and disobedient Admiral
Williams Rebolledo. In the end though, luck, superior Chilean strength and a new enemy
commander led to Grau’s defeat and death.
With the Peruvian navy essentially finished, the way was open for the Chileans to
invade and occupy the coveted Peruvian and Bolivian coastal provinces. This struggle
fills the next two chapters. It sees the Chileans conducting an opposed amphibious
landing, manoeuvring in extremely inhospitable terrain and ultimately defeating the allied
armies at the Battle of Tacna—essentially knocking Bolivia out of the war.
With the desired provinces seized, Chile hoped for peace. However, Peru was not
prepared to give up. Thus, the Chileans decided to invade central Peru and capture
Lima, the capital. By January 22, 1881 they had destroyed the hastily rebuilt Peruvian
army at the Battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores and entered the capital city.
Chapter Nine describes the bitter and murderous guerrilla war that the Peruvians
waged against the Chilean occupiers for another three years. Writing in 2006 and 2007,
the author provides a parallel, perhaps unconscious, with the United States’ current
experience in Iraq, making the point that “…Chile encountered more difficulties pacifying
the Peruvian interior than it did vanquishing the Allies during the War of the Pacific’s first
two years.” 2 This chapter contains the all too common litany of guerrilla wars—over-run
outposts, hard marching, privation, atrocities and the misery suffered by the civilian
population.
The above quick description of a single chapter captures one of the great benefits
of this book; it brings home the importance of the confluence of personalities, training,
cohesion, unique circumstances and logistics to the unfolding of any struggle. At a time
in history when some wish to give overwhelming prominence to the impact of new
technology on the conduct of war, it is valuable to be reminded that specific technologies
are simply tools that must be properly used in order to be relevant. By way of example,
a simple compilation of numbers, defensive works and the types of equipment available
to the Allies would prove that the Chileans could not have won the Battles of Tacna and
Chorrillos. In both battles the Chileans attacked and defeated numerically similar, dug
in opponents. The Chilean use of mass assault formations and frontal attacks against
Allied defences employing breech-loading rifles, rifled cannons, machine guns (mainly
Gatlings) and even some land mines should have been as bloodily defeated as most
similar attacks during the American Civil War and World War 1. Instead, the Chileans
won both battles decisively.
The final chapter of the book—the conclusion—is well written and brings the
narrative together in a very clear and informative fashion. One is left with a good
understanding of the lessons that could be drawn from the war.
While I found the book’s subject very interesting and its writing style enjoyable, it
has several problems that detracted from my appreciation of it. The first two relate to the
maps supporting the narrative. The complete lack of an overall map, showing the major
cities, political divisions and topographical features relevant to the campaigns, greatly
weakens the readers’ understanding of the author’s discussion of the wisdom, folly and
unfolding of certain plans and manoeuvres. Secondly, the maps that are provided
frequently lack important information discussed in the text. Thus, one has to ignore the
map or carefully read and reread the map and text to interpolate where the events
described occurred. The third weakness flows perhaps from the author’s academic,
rather than military, background. He is inconsistent in providing the technical details
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