The Canadian Army Journal

PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAYERS, EXTENDED
BOUNDARIES
CARMENT, David and RUDNER, Martin. Eds., New York, Routledge, 2006, 214 pages.
$134.50 CAN
Reviewed by Mr. Neil Chuka
A major difficulty of intervening in complex conflicts
and crises is acquiring, analyzing, sharing and applying
appropriate intelligence. Many, if not most, contemporary
conflicts seem to involve at least one, and usually
multiple, non-state actors. Traditional intelligence that
identifies such things as political hierarchies and force
capabilities and distribution normally used to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of a state based adversary
are insufficient for grasping the nuance of networks,
relationships, motives and centres of gravity of non-state
actors. While traditional intelligence products remain
useful, they must be bolstered with additional material
identifying the moral and physical strengths and
weaknesses of both adversarial and friendly groups
involved in a conflict. Equally important is developing the
understanding of what types of information and
intelligence is required, how these can be gained, fused
and applied.
To address these varied challenges, David Carment and Martin Rudner, both
professors at Carleton University’s Norman Patterson School of International Affairs,
have produced an edited collection of essays based on presentations at the conference
Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries that took place at
Carleton University in early December 2003.
The book draws out and briefly illustrates the major intelligence issues arising in
peacekeeping or peace support operations. These issues include the limitations of
conventional military intelligence processes and systems, the use of open-source
information, the development of human intelligence networks, the often problematic
relationship between non-governmental organizations and the military and the
maintenance of humanitarian space, and the expanded role and requirement for new
doctrine and training for some military capabilities. Indeed, the topics discussed in the
various essays continue to be noted as problems in contemporary lessons learned
documents, specifically with regard to intelligence sharing, verification of human and
open source intelligence, the synchronization of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, the integration of coalition staff, and the fusion and analysis of
intelligence. Importantly, the book is grounded in history, with a number of essays
detailing intelligence problems that characterized peace support missions from the mid
1990s to the turn of the century.
From these essays, three broad conclusions can be made: first, that much of the
intelligence required to effectively intervene in a conflict is open-source and that the
major issue is collating and distilling that information into a useful form; second, that the
issues raised and discussed in this book are in fact applicable to almost the entire
spectrum of military operations; and third, that there are no easy answers or set formulas
to facilitate cooperation between national government departments, coalition partner
governments, international organizations, or non-governmental organizations. Indeed,
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