The Canadian Army Journal

anks (mostly from the artillery),
“were willing—even determined—
but were NOT up to infantry
standards.” 28 In particular, he
pointed out their unfamiliarity with
the PIAT, the Bren, and in many
cases grenades which they
seemed afraid to handle.” It was
clear to the company commander
that “unnecessary casualties were
caused by their unfamiliarity with
infantry weapons.” 29 In addition,
their physical strength and stamina
was of concern as most were not in
shape for the arduous life of an
infantryman, and Carmichael noted
that “we nearly liquidated the lot by
marching them 60 or 70 miles.” 30
When it came to officer
reinforcements, Carmichael
considered them “adequate” but
some were unable to grasp brief orders necessitated by field conditions. According to
Carmichael, the acute problem within the rifle companies lay in “an almost desperate
want” of NCOs. 31 “Much good material was available” but time to train them during the
gruelling pursuit of the German army was lacking, and as a result, a desperate gap in
leadership appeared at the same moment as the Black Watch embarked on Operation
Blinder. 32
To augment the depleted ranks, and limit the effect of the collective inexperience of
the reinforcements, Mitchell added a sprinkling of new arrivals within the companies in
an effort to indoctrinate them to battlefield conditions. For extra support, leadership—
and to gain further experience himself—Lt. Joe Nixon joined Carmichael’s B Company
for the battle. 33
The plan for the Black Watch portion of “Blinder” seemed simple enough: following
a 15-minute assault barrage, B Company, under Carmichael, would advance on foot on
the right flank along the road leading North West into Spycker where they would
consolidate at the village church; C Company, under Pinkham, would move on the left
flank along the Colme Canal to the main crossroads west of the church. With the use of
troop carrying vehicles restricted by petrol shortages and treacherous roads whose soft
shoulders offered little mercy for heavy machines, the advance would be made by foot
over soggy terrain. To cover the attack, a barrage by 5th Field Regiment would precede
the attack, while 4.2-inch mortars were available on “on-call” for defensive fire tasks. 34
Again, ammunition shortages limited the duration of the both, and economy of effort was
the watchword for the day when it came to the fire plan. 35 With H-Hour set for 18:00, the
first boot crossed the start line at 18:05 and the battle for Spycker was on.
According to Pinkham, the artillery barrage in front of C Company “worked perfectly”
and was “completely successful,” but as the companies advanced, it was clear that some
of the recently arrived reinforcements were “jumpy” and command and control proved
difficult in the fading light. 36 The Black Watch marching through a liberated Dieppe 1944
C Company made good time and arrived on its objective with
little trouble. The only hitch came when the platoon on the right flank advanced too far
from one farm building to another and occupied an untenable position 400 yards from
the crossroads. Realizing his error, the platoon commander tried to extricate his men
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Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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