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About the Author…
Major Strickland is currently a student at the Joint Command and Staff Program at CFC
Toronto. Previously, he was the G3 of 1 CMBG and the Deputy Commanding Officer of 1 PPCLI,
with whom he deployed to Kandahar Province in 2006. He is currently completing his Masters of
Defence Studies as well as a Masters in Middle Eastern History.
Endnotes
1. Some will argue that the Taliban are “state-based” in that they briefly held power in Afghanistan and formed an
internationally recognized state power. This position is inherently weak, in that recognition was offered by only three other
states within the international arena, and because (as will be shown) the Taliban were initially formed on a tribal basis, and
were later augmented by recruits from numerous different states. Additionally, their activities lack the sanction of any state
while concurrently being conducted across international borders.
2. Accessed on 22 June 2007 at http://www.pnm.my/mtcp/images/maps/Afghanistan-map.jpg
3. For complete general details, it is recommended that the reader see the Afghanistan Country Handbook. (United
States Department of Defence. Afghanistan Country Handbook. Np: Government Printing Office, October 2003).
4. Afghanistan Country Handbook, 59.
5. For a more detailed synopsis of the Afghan-Soviet War, and indeed the tumultuous history of the country from its
formation, Victoria Scholfield’s work Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia (Victoria Schofield, Afghan
Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia (London: Taurus Park, 2003)) is highly recommended.
6. Kathy Gannon, I is for Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror: 18 Years Inside Afghanistan (New York: Public Affairs,
2005), 9.
7. Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan Under the Taliban.” Current History (February 1999): 80.
8. David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
2002), 272.
9. Barnett R. Rubin, 80.
10. Gannon, 25.
11. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: Yale University Press, 2000),
25.
12. Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Roots of Modern Jihad (London: Abacus, 2006), 290.
13. Ibid, 3.
14. Ibid, 4.
15. Gannon, 27-29.
16. Barnett R. Rubin, 79.
17. John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 16.
18. Michael Rubin, “Who is Responsible for the Taliban?” Middle East Review of International Affairs. (Volume 6,
Number 1, March 2002): 9. Accessed on 20 June 2007 at http:meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/jv6n1a1.html.
19. John C. Griffiths, Afghanistan: A History of Conflict (London: Carlton Books, 2001), 227.
20. Ibid.
21. Burnett R. Rubin, 80.
22. Gannon, 86.
23. Burnett R. Rubin, 79-80.
24. Ibid.
25. A complete account of this incident is beyond the scope or aims of this paper. Interested readers are strongly
encouraged to read Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars (Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and
Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2005).
26. Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (Toronto: Penguin, 2003), 86.
27. Ibid.
28. Rashid, 13.
29. Burnett R. Rubin, 80.
30. Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. (London: Harper Collins, 2005), 31.
31. Rashid, 32.
32. Esposito, 17.
33. Edwards, 294.
34. Gannon, 33.
35. Allen, 274.
36. Michael Rubin, 13.
37. Allen, 275.
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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