The Canadian Army Journal

ideology.” 51 With the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, these efforts were stepped
up in a bid to mitigate the influence of Ayatollah Khomeini on the Shia branch of Islam. 52
It must be noted that these endeavours were largely financed by the significant profits
which had accrued to the Saudi state as a result of our own desire for petroleum; it is not
a stretch to argue that the west largely paid for the exporting of this brand of extremism
to much of the Muslim world—including Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The physical manifestation of the support provided by Saudi Arabia was the creation
of madrassas along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. The beliefs and practices within
the schools are aptly described by Canadian journalist Eric Margolis, who writes:
Education in the madrassas was basic: memorizing the Holy Koran and
learning the rudiment of reading and writing…Some of the Saudi and Gulffunded
madrassas were staffed by Mullahs and teachers from Arabia… [they]
brought with them Wahhabism…53 The Wahhabi version of faith was little different from the Deobandi. Robert Fisk has
stated that “It was a purist, Sunni…faith whose interpretation of Sharia law recalled the
most draconian of Christian prelates.” 54 The similarities between the two sects have
sometimes led to a belief that they are in fact the same. This is not the case, although
they both articulate similar views on the world at large and the role of Islam in it; that they
were both present in the refugee camps in the border regions of Afghanistan and
Pakistan can only be described as unfortunate. Drawing willing, extremist-minded
recruits from these madrassas, the Taliban possesses a significant recruiting base from
which to find new insurgents.
Pakistani support however has not strictly been limited to the provision of education
and indoctrination to the Taliban’s recruiting base; the state was also active in the supply
of direct support to the Taliban regime and it is probably a safe assertion to argue that
segments of the Pakistani government are still backing elements within the insurgency.
In the words of Michael Rubin, Pakistan was the “diplomatic and economic lifeline” which
“supplied a constant flow of munitions and recruits… [and] crucial technical infrastructure
support to allow the Taliban state to function…” 55 Coupled with this was the contribution
from the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, which began providing assistance to the
Afghan resistance movement as early as the mid-1970s. 56 Indeed when one considers
that it was the ISI that was directly responsible for the coordination of delivery of
sustainment to the Mujahidin, and that they “refused to recognize any Afghan resistance
group that was not religiously based” 57 it can be reasonably argued they contributed
directly to the initial formation of the Taliban by both fracturing the cohesion of the
Mujahidin and promoting Islamism. Further, it warrants note that this “shoring-up” is not
limited to the Pakistani government and some writers have stated that:
The Taliban receive support from traders based in Quetta, Peshawar, and
Karachi who are engaged in the transit and drug trade…they have contributed
to the Taliban’s treasury and are regularly assesses as needs arise. 58
It is in the realm of funding Pakistani support to the Taliban, that the relationship with
Saudi Arabia becomes apparent. Returning to the words of Burnett Rubin, writing in
1999:
Saudi Arabia appears to have continued to fund much of Pakistan’s policy in
Afghanistan through both official and unofficial channels… Saudi Arabia feels
some affinity to the Taliban interpretation of Islam, and support for the Taliban
is consistent with its rivalry with Iran and long-term strategic cooperation with
Pakistan. 59
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