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118 Guideline 3: Develop partnerships with non-traditional allies; solutions may not always involve the application of force Dr Lindsey used the example of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan to illustrate this guideline. Operations in Afghanistan draw attention to the requirement of “knowing the enemy,” including its capabilities and intentions, and to planning operations on the footbed of good intelligence. He suggested that the situation in Afghanistan seems more confused than it should be, and that the CF could do more in Afghanistan by developing partnerships with non-traditional allies: “Maybe the solution lies outside the military. For example, can we find out what the ‘good’ Muslims think about the situation; those who do not want to get blown up and are interested in problem solving?” 28 He suggested that Muslim communities participate in discussions regarding governance challenges with the Government of Canada, which would facilitate our ability to understand what the requirements of the local population, the local security forces and their need, versus telling them what we are going to do to them if they do not cooperate. This, he argued, would be an active area of research for psychologists or those involved in personal behaviour analysis. 29 With the importance of sending the right people (not just armed forces) to prosecute a counter-insurgency campaign being recognized as common to successful counterinsurgencies, 30 Dr Lindsey maintained that Canadian police and constabulary forces, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), could be used to support more tasks and reinforce the mission. In addition, Dr Lindsey suggested that there is a need to examine the system of trust, and understand on the nature of the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, including its cultural, political and geographic context: “The mistake by the US in Iraq was that they abolished the army after they invaded. We need to find out more on how to support Afghan locals, not look down at them through the barrel of a gun.” 31 Canada’s strategy in Afghanistan is based upon assisting and enabling the Afghan people to rebuild their country along three ‘pillars’ of activity that are consistent with the “Afghan Compact,” namely Security, Governance (rule of law, Human Rights) and Economic and Social Development. 32 This reinforces the notion that military operations are part of a coordinated and integrated approach among communities responsible for diplomacy, defence and development. Guideline 4: Synthesize the “so what” of emerging issues, concepts and technologies In a 1950s issue of the Canadian Army Journal, Dr Lindsey wrote an article on “The Roles of Radar.” The purpose of this article was to outline the basic relationships that determined the performance of a radar set, and to show how many of the features conflict with each other. 33 But the role of the analyst is much larger than this: he must be able to articulate emerging developments in science and technology (S&T), changes in the geo-political environment and strategic concepts in such a way as to highlight the potential opportunities, limitations and implications in the context of military requirements. Extending the scientific frontiers of knowledge is not always a mandatory requirement for influencing the military combat development process or field operations. While OR analyses must be timely and relevant, lengthy dissertations are not required for problems requiring an immediate answer. In other words, it is not necessary to develop a program when all that is required is a ‘quick-look’ assessment. Besides acting as a “strategic sensor” in tracking and monitoring emerging developments and trends, one of the roles of the OR analyst is to realize the potential application of a new subject, acting as what Dr Lindsey referred to as an “education Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
assistant” for the military. 34 The role of OR is to bring to the attention the technical, political and strategic aspects to the military of technology, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or stealth technology. It is important to introduce and cover these issues so that clear deductions can be made regarding military utility. For example, the “Information Requirements for Aerospace Defence” is what Dr Lindsey referred to as a “good example of an OR group working within a HQ environment.” 35 This document involved identifying and capturing requirements, gaps and deficiencies—it may not be OR in the purist sense of the word, but it is vital to explain trends, threats and opportunities of a subject in a clear, concise and timely manner. 36 The content and presentation of material derived from these studies can be used to educate Commanders and staff, and can have a substantial influence on defence policy and planning. 37 Conclusion A strategic partnering approach that builds on core competencies in data collection and assessment, strategic analysis, wargaming and force structure analysis are keys to the success of most OR activities. Often, there is a need to identify and employ special advisors and research personnel with a wide variety of backgrounds (in educational disciplines, training and experience). In order to affect military outcomes, they must be able and willing to collaborate, explain and combine their ideas. Equipment organization should be designed to be able to undertake a wide variety of useful services, and attention should be paid to the investigation of the possible future capabilities of emerging technologies, such as UAVs, space communications and overhead surveillance. Small and medium sized countries (like Canada), which belong to an international alliance with military responsibilities, should seek to combine their roles with those of other carefully chosen small and medium sized partners. Endnotes 1. For background, see George Lindsey, “Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research on Radar in World War II,” Canadian Military History, Vol.5, No.2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 69-74. 2. W.C. Brown, “Wartime Radar Research and Development by the National Research Council of Canada: Recollections and a Tribute,” in George R. Lindsey, (ed)., No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 41. 3. Interview, Dr George R. Lindsey, 14 April 2007, Ottawa, ON. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. See for example, his G.R. Lindsey, “Statistical Data Useful for the Operation of a Baseball Team,” Operations Research Vol.7, No.2 (March-April 1959), pp. 197-207; George Lindsey, “Managing the Expos to the world’s championship,” Optimum, Vol.2, No.1 (1971), pp. 23-28 7. OR studies into areas ach as survival, ballistic missile defence, military use of space, arms control and logistics are described in: G.R. Lindsey, Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada, ORD Informal Paper No. 67/P10 (Ottawa: National Defence, Operational Research Division, December 1967). 8. G. Lindsey, “Four good decades of OR in the Canadian Department of National Defence,” Journal of the Operational Research Society No. 49 (1998), p. 329. 9. See George R. Lindsey “Operational research and systems analysis in the Department of National Defence,” Optimum, Vol.3, No.2 (1972). 10. This report reflects the evolution of strategic thinking and considers the meaning of military strategy in a much broader context. See G.R. Lindsey, A Resume of the Military Strategies in the Two World Wars, ORD Informal Paper No. 65/P14 (Ottawa: Defence Research Analysis Establishment, August 1965), p. 14. 11. After serving the Canadian Armoured Corps in World War II, and obtaining a PhD in economics, Dr Sutherland rose to Chief of the Operational Research Division until his untimely death in 1967. For a good example of the analysis of the economic relationship and defence, consult: R.J. Sutherland, Cost/Effectiveness and Defence Management: Mr. Macnamara’s Pentagon, ORD Informal Paper No. 66/P21 (Ottawa: National Defence, Operational Research Division, September 1966). 12. Interview, op. cit. Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 119
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The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
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EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
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ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
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AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
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Since 1945, only one major expediti
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Casualties It is difficult to deter
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March 1846, in which the insurgency
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French fortified line around the De
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an unsustainable level while using
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The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
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The overall resort to a system of d
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proposed by researchers like La Cou
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MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTE
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is tempo—the ability of one force
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In Principles, Imperatives and Para
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Canadian draft placed a significant
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to safe havens with the Morice Line
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THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
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Political manoeuvring and military
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sustainment air corridors, and to s
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offensive capability would be requi
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Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
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Immediately after the war, there wa
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transportable brigade group, includ
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spectrum, and included global opera
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strung soldiers of the unit adequat
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45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
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the super-power of the age. Few gov
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By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
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ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
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obvious abilities is to make a grav
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We fight them with schools, educati
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TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian
Page 69 and 70: dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72: Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73 and 74: Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 75 and 76: armoured squadron, administration c
Page 77 and 78: system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80: 31. Today, the role of the infantry
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Page 83 and 84: Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86: It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88: increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90: contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92: What has been demonstrated in this
Page 93 and 94: Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96: Concluding Remarks This article has
Page 97 and 98: the engagement of the Canadian Mano
Page 99 and 100: 42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
Page 101 and 102: into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
Page 103 and 104: anks (mostly from the artillery),
Page 105 and 106: Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
Page 107 and 108: town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110: Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112: Canadian Military History (Spring 2
Page 113 and 114: On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116: NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
Page 117 and 118: In the years after 1945 OR became h
Page 119: narrow application. “If aircraft
Page 123 and 124: — BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTO
Page 125 and 126: CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
Page 127 and 128: as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
Page 129 and 130: writes that the charge of the 21st
Page 131 and 132: Reserves the reader could put this
Page 133 and 134: superiority of numbers to overcome
Page 135 and 136: A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
Page 137 and 138: THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
Page 139 and 140: The Existential Challenge The autho
Page 141 and 142: D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
Page 143 and 144: His dispassionate analysis of the b
Page 145 and 146: PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
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Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four ends with the death of
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