The Canadian Army Journal

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gaining the initiative is not always so easily done, as governments are often unwilling or
unable to act decisively in the early stages of insurgency when the insurgent forces are
weak and their plans still in development. 32 Likewise, at the tactical level, pre-empting
an insurgent force that has intimate knowledge of the countryside and urban areas and
that operates clandestinely amongst the population is a daunting task. However, there
are examples of pre-emption in COIN warfare; one being the defeat of the Huks in the
1950s in the Philippines. In that case, the Philippine Secretary of National Defence,
Magsaysay, deployed the army early on to hunt down and destroy the Huk insurgents
while also addressing many of the grievances held by the populace the Huks were
purportedly fighting for. This approach had the Huks on the defensive almost
immediately and quickly made their plans for a popular uprising untenable and
irrelevant33 —in other words they were pre-empted.
Examples of dislocation in COIN abound although they are seldom referred to as
such. The most obvious example of this method is population control, whereby a COIN
force attempts to cut insurgents from their base of support by either winning the locals
over to the government side, tightly controlling the activities of the populace, or removing
civilians from the contested area altogether. In each case the aim is to either “remove
the enemy from the decisive point or vice versa” as Leonhard would say. The population
constitutes the decisive point, as insurgencies are essentially wars for control of the
population and insurgent forces can be removed from that point (or vice versa) either
physically or morally. Physical removal is accomplished through forced evacuations of
contested areas, concentration of civilians in fortified villages or strict controls on civilian
movement. Variations on these techniques were used to good effect by the British in
Malaya during the 1950s and, as Wade Markel explains: “Denied effective access to
supporters and supplies, the insurgency melted away.” 34
Modern COIN campaigns have tended away from physical dislocation and instead
place a greater emphasis on the moral separation of the insurgent from the populace.
Strategies that focus on gaining popular support for the legitimate host government are
ultimately intended to wrest control of the decisive point. By reinforcing, or even creating
a government in a host-nation, COIN forces are often attempting to redress grievances
amongst the population or demonstrate the legitimacy of said government. Bringing
lawful, representative governance, providing security, and offering economic
development aid are all methods by which a COIN force attempts to win over a
population and deny access to the insurgents. In describing the British practice of
improving infrastructure, security, and medical care for squatters in the Malayan
campaign of the 1950s, Markel states: “These small but significant steps eliminated
many of the grievances which had animated the squatters, thereby depriving the
insurgents of considerable support.” 35 This is an example of moral dislocation of an
insurgent force and, combined with the physical dislocation mentioned above; it allowed
the British to ultimately defeat the Communists. Today in Afghanistan and Iraq, much of
the COIN effort is focused on morally dislocating the enemy with particular emphasis on
developing legitimate governance structures that offer a viable alternative to that of the
insurgents and economic development to redress grievances. In essence, this is the aim
behind the “Build” phase of the “Clear-Hold-Build” method advocated in US manual
FM 3-24.
Finally, disrupting, or attacking the critical vulnerability, of an insurgent force is also
evident in past and contemporary COIN campaigns. As was mentioned above, insurgent
forces must intuitively all possess a critical vulnerability be it their leadership, supply
lines, safe haven or external political support. While some of these critical vulnerabilities
are difficult to hit, others have been successfully targeted by COIN forces, often with
great success. In addition to the aforementioned case of the French cutting off access
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008