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13. Ibid. 14. G.R. Lindsey, Strategy and Economics of Intercontinental Missile Defence, ORD Informal Paper No. 66/P23 (Ottawa: National Defence, Operational Research Division, October 1966). 15. Interview, op. cit. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. For an outstanding treatment on Canadian science in the Second World War involving the first-hand contributions of war-time scientists, see George R. Lindsey, (ed)., No Day Long Enough. 20. For more information on this topic, see: G. R. Lindsey, Canadian Maritime Strategy: Should the Emphasis be Change? DRAE Report no. 5 (Ottawa: Defence Research Analysis Establishment, July 1969). 21. Interview, op. cit. 22. Ibid. 23. G. R. Lindsey, The Allocation of Resources in an Alliance, ORD Informal Paper No. 65/P13 (Ottawa, National Defence, Operational Research Division, August 1965). 24. Interview, op. cit. 25. George Lindsey, “Potential contributions by the Canadian Armed Forces to the defence of North America against terrorism,” International Journal Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp-309-334. 26. If reports on targets are intermittent, non-continuous and it is difficult to get an exact “fix” on the target’s location because of limitations in seeing through clutter such as clouds, there may be intermittent signals that can be exploited to see objects. See George R. Lindsey, “Interception Strategy based on Intermittent Information,” Operations Research Vol.16, No. 3 (May-June 1968), pp. 489-508. 27. Interview, op. cit. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005), pp. 8-12. 31. Interview, op. cit. 32. “Building on Success: The London Conference on Afghanistan 31 January—1 February 2006: The Afghanistan Compact,” Available at: http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf 33. G.R. Lindsey, “The Roles of Radar,” Canadian Army Journal Vol.5, No.11 (February 1952), pp. 17-31. 34. Interview, op. cit. 35. Ibid. 36. George Lindsey, The Information Requirements for Aerospace Defence: The Limits Impose by Geometry and Technology, Bailrigg Memorandum 27 (Lancaster University: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1997). 37. For example, Dr Lindsey used the example of how a family of two-dimensional charts linking numbers of weapons to deterrence strategies facilitated the ability of the analyst to convey a message and explore possibilities. The relationships between strategic nuclear warheads, deterrence and Canadian security are recurring themes in Dr Lindsey’s writings. For a more detailed explanation of the charts, consult: George Lindsey, Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Fewer Would Be Better but Zero Would Be Imprudent (Waterloo: The Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, ND). George R. Lindsey, The Strategic Defence of North America (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986) contains insights on strategic nuclear deterrence developments. 120 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
— BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTORY: FIRST CANADIAN ARMY AND THE SCHELDT ESTUARY: SEPTEMBER 13, NOVEMBER 6, 1944 ZUELHKE, Mark. Douglas & McIntyre, 2007, 545 pages. $37.95 Reviewed by 2Lt Thomas Fitzgerald, 2 Irish R of C By September 1944, the war in Europe appeared won. The Allies, having stormed ashore at Normandy, had succeeded in encircling, destroying and routing the German army. In the pursuit that followed, the Allies had bounced the Seine River and were moving rapidly towards Germany. In the North, Brussels had fallen to the British Second Army on September 2, Antwerp, two days later. But in this success lay the seeds for, arguably, an unnecessary and bloody campaign—the Battle of the Scheldt Estuary, brilliantly and meticulously analyzed in Mark Zuelhke’s “Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign.” By the fall of 1944, the Allies were in grave trouble. “The Pursuit” of the previous summer had stalled due to logistical problems—the Allies were still trucking supplies in from the Normandy beaches, hundreds of miles from the front lines. There was dissention in the top command regarding how to conclude the war. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery favoured a narrow thrust across the northern German plain, while the Americans, under the command of General Omar Bradley favoured a broad front approach to Germany. Montgomery won the argument leading to the disastrous Operation MARKET GARDEN, vividly portrayed in the movie, “A Bridge Too Far”, from the book of the same name. Finally, relations between Montgomery and General H.D.G. Crerar, Commander of the First Canadian Army, while never warm, had particularly soured due in part, to Montgomery’s inability to recognize Crerar as a thoroughly Canadian general and not simply a dominion general. By October 1944, with the failure of MARKET GARDEN and the Supreme Command’s insistence that the port of Antwerp be opened, Montgomery switched priorities and directed the Scheldt Estuary be cleared. The plan for opening the estuary was devised by Lieutenant General Guy Simmonds (General Crerar had left for England on medical leave) and consisted of four phases: � clearing the area north of Antwerp and securing access to South Beveland; � reduction of the Breskens Pocket, north of Antwerp (Operation SWITCHBACK); � capture of South Beveland (Operation VITALITY); and � the capture of Walcheren Island (Operation INFATUATE). Relying on primary and secondary sources and interviews with the survivors, Zuelhke paints a vivid picture of the plight and the bravery of the Canadian soldiers in the battle that should not have been fought. From the insane (the near destruction of the Canadian Highland Regiment (the Black Watch) at Woensdrecht on “Black Friday”) Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 121
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The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
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EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
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ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
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AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
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Since 1945, only one major expediti
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Casualties It is difficult to deter
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March 1846, in which the insurgency
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French fortified line around the De
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an unsustainable level while using
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The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
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The overall resort to a system of d
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proposed by researchers like La Cou
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MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTE
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is tempo—the ability of one force
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In Principles, Imperatives and Para
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Canadian draft placed a significant
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to safe havens with the Morice Line
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THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
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Political manoeuvring and military
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sustainment air corridors, and to s
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offensive capability would be requi
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Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
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Immediately after the war, there wa
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transportable brigade group, includ
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spectrum, and included global opera
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strung soldiers of the unit adequat
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45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
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the super-power of the age. Few gov
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By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
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ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
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obvious abilities is to make a grav
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We fight them with schools, educati
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TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian
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dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72: Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73 and 74: Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 75 and 76: armoured squadron, administration c
Page 77 and 78: system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80: 31. Today, the role of the infantry
Page 81 and 82: somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000
Page 83 and 84: Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86: It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88: increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90: contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92: What has been demonstrated in this
Page 93 and 94: Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96: Concluding Remarks This article has
Page 97 and 98: the engagement of the Canadian Mano
Page 99 and 100: 42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
Page 101 and 102: into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
Page 103 and 104: anks (mostly from the artillery),
Page 105 and 106: Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
Page 107 and 108: town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110: Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112: Canadian Military History (Spring 2
Page 113 and 114: On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116: NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
Page 117 and 118: In the years after 1945 OR became h
Page 119 and 120: narrow application. “If aircraft
Page 121: assistant” for the military. 34 T
Page 125 and 126: CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
Page 127 and 128: as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
Page 129 and 130: writes that the charge of the 21st
Page 131 and 132: Reserves the reader could put this
Page 133 and 134: superiority of numbers to overcome
Page 135 and 136: A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
Page 137 and 138: THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
Page 139 and 140: The Existential Challenge The autho
Page 141 and 142: D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
Page 143 and 144: His dispassionate analysis of the b
Page 145 and 146: PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
Page 147 and 148: Thankfully, although hard-hitting i
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four ends with the death of
Page 151 and 152: noting he did not fill the requirem
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