The Canadian Army Journal

Political manoeuvring and military desire taken into account, the historical question
at the center of the debate over Canadian airborne forces remains relevant today: Does
Canada actually require an airborne capability? This paper will explore the political
motives, doctrinal foundations and military requirements of airborne forces throughout
the Canadian experience, from their beginnings in 1942 until the present. This analysis
will set the stage for an examination of the role future Canadian airborne forces might
have within the context of the future security environment and the foreseeable political
future. In the end, however, the conclusion that Canada does not require an airborne
capability is inescapable.
Background
Before engaging in a discussion on airborne capability, it is first necessary to
understand exactly what the modern term “airborne” implies. The most recent Canadian
doctrine, published in 1990, defines an airborne operation as “… a joint operation
involving the air movement of forces into an objective area. Troops and equipment may
be delivered by parachute, by helicopter, or airlanded [sic].” 7 At the time, this definition
seemed to be inclusive of airmobile operations and yet, despite this inclusiveness, a
separate Canadian Forces publication exists for airmobile operations. 8 Furthermore, the
current airborne operations manual only attempts to cover what it considers the most
complex delivery method—a parachute drop.
More modern Canadian definitions clearly make a distinction between airborne and
airmobile forces. Canadian Land Force Tactical Doctrine makes this distinction by
stating that “… the term “airborne” refers to parachute or (fixed wing) air transported
delivery as opposed to tactical (heliborne) mobility.” 9 This understanding of airborne is
consistent with NATO and American definitions10 and, therefore, will be used throughout
this paper.
From an American perspective, airborne forces are elite11 units that are specially
trained and equipped to conduct ‘forced-entry’ or to lead assaults into enemy territory
and then hold an area open until reinforcements arrive to continue operations. 12 This
broad perspective translates into the ability of airborne forces to conduct a range of
missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels that American and Canadian
doctrine both recognize. These missions fall into the general categories of seizing and
holding operations, airborne interdiction operations and airborne raids. 13 These
missions, and the capabilities inherent in air delivery, demonstrate the greatest strength
of airborne forces—a capability to rapidly project strategic power over great distances. 14
In conjunction with this strength, Canada also recognizes that airborne forces have
additional characteristics that separate them from conventional forces. These
characteristics include flexibility, lightness and shock effect. 15
The flexibility of airborne forces resides in their range of tactical employment. They
can be used in widely varying terrain (urban, jungle, mountain) and can also be delivered
by helicopter, vehicle or on foot (despite the previous definition of airborne). Their light
equipment (in weight and quantity) make accurate intelligence and detailed planning key
factors for success but this creates a spirit of resilience and adaptability focused on the
soldier vice the equipment. The employment of airborne forces with audacity is risky;
however, it can create a shock effect out of proportion to the size or capabilities of the
force.
Airborne forces are not without their limitations which, placed in a modern Canadian
context, are considerable. They require large numbers of transport aircraft for delivery
and sustainment. Limited numbers of costly air transport resources and the need to
protect them create the need to gain air superiority, at least for the insertion and
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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