The Canadian Army Journal

68
fire and the precision and range of munitions. The appropriate mix of weapons systems
can therefore be chosen to achieve the desired effect.” 11 Put into other terms, “each
weapon is used according to its characteristics” and “weapons are used to complement
rather than counteract each other.” 12
Unfortunately the doctrinal splitting of firepower into organic and fire support fails to
provide an adequate structure on which to plan a firepower system of complementary
weapons. The categories are incongruently defined, impose unnecessary cognitive
constraints, and (in the case of organic firepower) lack definition. Organic fire is defined
by its organizational position while fire support is defined by a role. This creates an
absurd situation in which mortars in a fire base could simultaneously be organic fire and
fire support, and at the same time a long range precision artillery system destroying high
value targets (HVTs) identified by advanced sensor capabilities would be neither organic
fire nor fire support. A fall-out of this incongruence is that cognitive limitations may be
imposed on the employment of weapons. Despite the categories, organic fire may be
used for fire support as seen by tanks or machine guns forming a firebase, and fire
support may be called to produce effects which are ends in themselves as seen in the
long range destruction of HVTs. However, these are small problems which most soldiers
are capable of seeing beyond. The greatest weakness of “organic” and “fire support” as
terms is the failure to fully define a doctrine for organic firepower. In all, one sentence
and three short paragraphs are dedicated to the topic as compared to the one chapter
plus two books which are dedicated to fire support. 13
The Leopard C2 expanded the close fire capability of mechanized forces in
Afghanistan
The failure of the terms “organic” and “fire support” has resulted in their frequently
being supplanted by “direct” and “indirect” as doctrinal constructs. This is seen in the
direct fire system, 14 direct fire regiment, 15 future indirect fire capability (FIFC), 16 and even
the role of artillery to assist in the defeat of the enemy with indirect fire as part of the all
arms battle. 17 Unfortunately, “direct” 18 and “indirect” 19 focus on the means of aiming or
delivering munitions onto targets and they do nothing to define roles or effects from
which to design a capability. Compounding the problem of “direct” and “indirect” is that
the “traditional division between direct and indirect fire is becoming less meaningful.” 20
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
Photo Source: TF 3-06, R22eR Coy