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On a more tangible note, we also need to exploit the opportunities afforded by
tribalism over the pan-Islamic dogma and theory that currently give the insurgency a
portion of its power. Our first course of action needs to be the consistent reinforcement
of the legitimate government of Afghanistan, however this does not always achieve
results in a society with little tradition, respect for, or understanding of a central
government. In cases where this type of situation exists, we should be promoting the
tribe as an entity and source of power, over the village imam or mullah.
Pursuing a different avenue, we also need to stop indirectly funding the Taliban
through our society’s use of illicit drugs, and the purchase of fossil fuels from Saudi
Arabia. The dollars that are being spent by our populations and our governments, which
are then ending up in the pockets of the Taliban, are akin to us providing bullets with
which to see our soldiers, diplomats and aid-workers shot. Options that might make this
achievable include purchasing the poppy crop from Afghan farmers ourselves, and either
destroying it or using it for medicinal purposes. Western societies subsidize farmers
throughout their countries; why not subsidize Afghan farmers to the point that they no
longer grow poppy? We could pay them far more than the Taliban to grow nothing, and
even more to grow an alternative crop that could provide sustenance for their families. 70
The purchase of fossil fuels is a somewhat more difficult nut to crack, but our
dependence on these fuels, and our purchasing of them from extremist regimes simply
is not a sustainable course of action. Notwithstanding the obvious harm it does to the
environment, we are providing our enemies a vulnerability which can be exploited while
concurrently bankrolling their efforts. We need to undertake concentrated, deliberate
efforts to wean ourselves from this critical element in the Taliban’s ability to continue to
prosecute operations. 71
As previously argued, security needs to continue to be provided, although we must
be wary of attempting to copy the model provided by the Soviet Union, of attempting to
“destroy an idea with firepower.” 72 Though such an approach might remove the
immediate threat, it also contributes to the growth of the next generation of fighters.
Every Taliban we kill leaves behind a mother, father, brother or son who will potentially
become more disillusioned with the legitimate regime and more disposed to take up the
cause that killed his loved one. This lesson is inherent in the conduct of almost every
counter-insurgency over the past two hundred years, and it is one we can ill afford to
ignore. Our use of force has to be less like a bludgeon and far more like a scalpel if it is
to contribute positively to the eradication of the current threat.
Such a fight is going to take time. This caution is ably provided by Thomas
Hammes, who has stated that “we must be prepared for the long-term close-in fight
necessary to destroy [the Taliban] network.” 73 However, the prognosis for success is not
as grim as some might believe. Indeed, author Caleb Car has written:
As long as the Western allies treat those Afghans who strive for progress as
political and moral equals, and accepts the responsibility that years of abusive
behaviour ranging from British imperialism to Soviet expansionism to CIA
meddling have incurred, precedent suggests that those troubles will be
surmounted. 74
This “acceptance of responsibility” should not mean anything other than continuing
to attempt to ameliorate the situation. This can be done through effective use of
diplomacy and development, gaining an understanding of the conditions which lead to
the rise of the Taliban, and holding firm in our resolve to honour our commitments to
solve the problems. As was argued, our first step here needs to be in the provision of
education. As Dr. Sean Maloney has stated:
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008