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16 French government was particularly weak under the institutions of the Fourth Republic. 37 The French government attempted to address some of the most pressing political and social problems found in Indochina, but this was mostly a matter of too little, too late. 38 The limited legitimacy that the colonial regime had among the Indochinese population was irremediably lost. Lessons Learned The French forces in Indochina had to deal constantly with ambushes, mines and booby traps. In spite of improving their counter-insurgency approach at the tactical and operational level, they still sustained losses that were quite substantial. The sale guerre was new and deeply problematic, but, unfortunately for the French, there was no strategic solution to the strategic problem that it caused. Though the strategic commitment to keeping their colony intact was strong at the onset, it weakened gradually to the point where defeat became an acceptable option. Certainly one of the weakest points in the French approach to the Indochina conflict was the lack of political and social measures to bring the indigenous society back into a wider French partnership. It took a long time for the French to realize that handling an insurgency is about dealing with the population as much as dealing with the insurgents. The ancestors who fought in Algeria in the 19th century understood that, although they were using extreme means to achieve their end. Many mistakes were made during the conflict, but they provided a foundation for the French to develop a new approach to counter-insurgency in Algeria a few years later. Algeria in the 20 th Century (1954-1962) General Description In 1954, France was just coming to the unsuccessful end of a major counterinsurgency operation in Indochina when it was drawn into a second one in Algeria. This time, however, the French government perceived things differently. Algeria was just across the Mediterranean Sea, only hours from Marseilles. As well, over one million French settlers were living there among eight million indigenous Muslims. With its large non-Muslim population, Algeria was considered from an administrative point of view as an integral part of metropolitan France. Hence, in 1954, François Mitterand’s slogan “l’Algérie c’est la France” (Algeria is France) was quite meaningful and illustrated the new resolve in dealing with the growing insurgency. To ensure that Algeria would remain French, the government in Paris eventually committed 400,000 troops, many of them reservists and conscripts. Lastly, it is important to note that the experience with revolutionary warfare in Indochina prompted the French armed forces to develop their own countermeasure aimed at controlling the population: counter-revolutionary warfare. 39 The enemy eventually coalesced around the Front de libération nationale (FLN), which was inspired by both nationalism and revolutionary ideologies. The FLN was never able to mount any substantial military engagements, nor did it ever effectively use formations larger than a company in size. The FLN essentially employed guerrilla warfare and terrorism as its main tactics. Not only did the FLN use ambushes and improvised mines against the French Army, but it also mounted terrorist attacks against the non-Muslim population and Muslims collaborating with the French regime. As well, the FLN organized demonstrations and terrorist attacks in mainland France. The FLN received most of its external military support from Egypt, whose ruler, Nasser, was committed to fighting European colonialism. The FLN was able to use neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco as operating bases until the French Army effectively sealed the borders. The FLN strategy was aimed at increasing the costs of counter-insurgency to Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
an unsustainable level while using the increased repression by the French to garner further support from indigenous Algerians. 40 Casualties The challenge caused by ambushes, booby traps, explosive devices and mines was also serious in Algeria. The death toll for the French forces was about 28,000. 41 It is difficult to determine causes of death, but the French Ministry of Defence stated that nearly 16,000 died in combat or as a result of unconventional attacks (attentats). 42 Given the FLN tactics, it is reasonable to assume that ambushes and mines caused the vast majority of those deaths. In the early parts of the conflict, the French Army, police posts and patrols were ambushed on a regular basis by FLN guerrilla units, resulting in heavy casualties. 43 Losses caused by ambushes and mines continued until the very end of the conflict. 44 Tactical and Operational adjustments The ongoing ambushes faced by the French Army, the spread of the insurgency and the terrorist attacks against the European population of Algeria forced the French to take a series of countermeasures. In December 1956, General Raoul Salan was named Commander-in-Chief in Algeria; he rapidly designed and implemented a counterinsurgency plan based on the lessons that he had learned in Indochina. A system known as quadrillage was put in place dividing the country into a grid. A permanent force was assigned to patrol and pacify each square created by the grid. This operational innovation was only possible because the French government agreed to build up troop numbers with reservists and conscripts. 45 Tactically, it took some time for the French Army to adjust to counter-guerrilla warfare, 46 but lessons learned and better use of human intelligence from pro-French Muslims eventually paid off. Once pacification was successful in an area, the Army was assigned to support civil-military reconstruction units known as Sections Administratives Spécialisées dedicated to re-establishing normal life in communities by working on projects and distributing food and medicine. To Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 Combat camera IS2004-9001a 17
Page 1 and 2: The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
Page 5 and 6: EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
Page 7 and 8: ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
Page 9 and 10: AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
Page 11 and 12: Since 1945, only one major expediti
Page 13 and 14: Casualties It is difficult to deter
Page 15 and 16: March 1846, in which the insurgency
Page 17: French fortified line around the De
Page 21 and 22: The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
Page 23 and 24: The overall resort to a system of d
Page 25 and 26: proposed by researchers like La Cou
Page 27 and 28: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTE
Page 29 and 30: is tempo—the ability of one force
Page 31 and 32: In Principles, Imperatives and Para
Page 33 and 34: Canadian draft placed a significant
Page 35 and 36: to safe havens with the Morice Line
Page 37 and 38: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
Page 39 and 40: Political manoeuvring and military
Page 41 and 42: sustainment air corridors, and to s
Page 43 and 44: offensive capability would be requi
Page 45 and 46: Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
Page 47 and 48: Immediately after the war, there wa
Page 49 and 50: transportable brigade group, includ
Page 51 and 52: spectrum, and included global opera
Page 53 and 54: strung soldiers of the unit adequat
Page 55 and 56: 45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
Page 57 and 58: the super-power of the age. Few gov
Page 59 and 60: By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
Page 61 and 62: ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
Page 63 and 64: obvious abilities is to make a grav
Page 65 and 66: We fight them with schools, educati
Page 67 and 68: TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian
Page 69 and 70:
dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72:
Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73 and 74:
Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 75 and 76:
armoured squadron, administration c
Page 77 and 78:
system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80:
31. Today, the role of the infantry
Page 81 and 82:
somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000
Page 83 and 84:
Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86:
It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88:
increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90:
contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92:
What has been demonstrated in this
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Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96:
Concluding Remarks This article has
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the engagement of the Canadian Mano
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42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
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into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
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anks (mostly from the artillery),
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Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
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town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110:
Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112:
Canadian Military History (Spring 2
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On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116:
NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
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In the years after 1945 OR became h
Page 119 and 120:
narrow application. “If aircraft
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assistant” for the military. 34 T
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— BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTO
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CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
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as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
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writes that the charge of the 21st
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Reserves the reader could put this
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superiority of numbers to overcome
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A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
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THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
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The Existential Challenge The autho
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D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
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His dispassionate analysis of the b
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PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
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Thankfully, although hard-hitting i
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Chapter Four ends with the death of
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noting he did not fill the requirem
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