The Canadian Army Journal

is tempo—the ability of one force to act quicker than another and thereby gain an
advantage.
Leonhard expands upon Lind’s theory of manoeuvre warfare by looking beyond
tempo to other methods of defeating an enemy. Similarly to Lind’s, his theory is
focussed on defeating an enemy with the minimal necessary amount of force. However,
Leonhard explains in greater detail both why this is beneficial and how it can be
achieved. To begin, he compares manoeuvre warfare to attrition theory, which
emphasizes the physical destruction of the enemy. He explains how attrition is very
costly in terms of personnel, materiel and time but, more importantly, how it is often the
least effective method for defeating an enemy. Destruction and defeat are not
synonymous, and practitioners of attrition theory tend to emphasize the physical aspects
of war (loss exchange ratios, body counts) vice the psychological elements such as
morale, willpower, cohesion and fear. 6 This in turn leads to a focus among attritionist
commanders on colossal battles of strength versus strength where a maximum number
of kills can be achieved.
As defined by Leonhard, manoeuvre warfare “attempts to defeat the enemy through
means other than the simple destruction of his mass.” 7 Although a straightforward
definition, the ‘other means’ by which an enemy could be defeated necessitate an
explanation. Leonhard emphasizes that pre-emption is the most economical and often
most successful method for defeating an enemy. “Indeed the highest and purest
application of maneuver theory is to pre-empt the enemy, that is, to disarm or neutralize
him before the fight.” 8 This is in consonance with Lind’s emphasis on tempo and Boyd
Cycles as being central to manoeuvre warfare. However, Leonhard does not stop there
and goes on to describe other methods of defeating an enemy other than solely by the
destruction of his mass.
The next most preferred method, after pre-emption, is dislocation, which Leonhard
describes as “…removing the enemy from the decisive point, or vice versa, thus
rendering them useless and irrelevant to the fight.” 9 Dislocation is further classified as
either positional or functional dislocation. Positional dislocation involves making the
enemy’s location irrelevant through manoeuvre—the US “left hook” manoeuvre in
Operation Desert Storm being a key example of this method. By attacking far to the
West of Kuwait, the 3rd Army rendered the bulk of the Iraqi fixed defences irrelevant.
Functional dislocation refers to rendering an enemy’s strength irrelevant through tactics
and technology and is best illustrated with the example of forcing enemy tanks to fight in
close terrain, where they are most vulnerable and least able to bring their strengths to
bear. 10
Finally, Leonhard proposes disruption as the third method for defeating the enemy
more economically. He defines disruption as attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity, or
his critical vulnerability, thereby causing the enemy to lose cohesion and the will to fight.
Disruption is closely linked to battlefield psychology and its target is not the enemy forces
per se but rather the mind of the opposing commander and the morale of his soldiers. 11
Attacks on command and control nodes, logistics and transportation hubs and even
seats of political power are examples of disruption, provided they represent an enemy’s
critical vulnerability.
Leonhard’s work remains one of the most comprehensive and understandable
descriptions of modern manoeuvre warfare theory. Although not without its detractors, 12
manoeuvre warfare was adopted as the doctrinal basis for the US Army, US Marine
Corps, Canadian Army and most other NATO countries; indicating that it was considered
to be more than just a passing fad or revisionist interpretation of Second World War
German tactics. However, manoeuvre warfare was adopted as a means of defeating the
massed Soviet Tank Armies arrayed across the Inter German Border without having to
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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