The Canadian Army Journal

transportable brigade group, including a
parachute element, to counter small lodgements
on Canadian territory. It went on to explore the
possibility of earmarking these forces as part of
‘Mobile Forces’ designated for use by the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).
The report also concluded that Canada would be
able to withdraw troops from Europe and
maintain its NATO commitments if an airtransportable
brigade were available in Canada.
Although recommended as a long-term goal only,
the report stated that Canada could best
contribute to NATO with a strategically mobile
force. 65 Political expediency was again set to play
a role in Canadian airborne capability.
The 1964 White Paper echoed many of the
themes and conclusions from the 1963 report.
The White Paper proposed to make more
effective use of manpower by gradually
converting a brigade into a special service force
that was smaller, with air-portable and airdroppable
equipment.66 The MND, Paul Hellyer,
wanted the Canadian military to be restructured into a globally mobile force that was
capable of deterring war by rapidly responding to a wide range of situations. 67 This
proposal attempted to rationalize defence commitments with the minimum number of
forces and therefore, costs. This proposal had the benefit of appealing to a large number
of people while minimizing the costs of defence commitments. Globally deployable
troops could fulfill alliance tasks and be available to defend Canadian sovereignty. An
Army analysis of defence commitments included requirements for heavy forces
(armoured and mechanized) for NATO in Europe and light forces (airborne/airtransportable)
for the defence of Canada, peacekeeping, the SACEUR Mobile Force,
and small limited wars. 68
The formation of an airborne capability in Canada was again more a function of
political expediency than the existence of a clear and defined role, and if any political
dissention or concern over the formation of airborne forces existed at the time, it was
overshadowed by the issues of unification of the services. 69 The stage had been set for
a rebirth of a Canadian airborne capability and, in December 1966, Hellyer stated that
“… [Force Mobile] Command is also forming the Canadian Airborne Regiment whose
personnel and equipment can be rapidly sent to danger zones.” 70
Combat camera 2007-0876
The Canadian Airborne Regiment—The Initial Uncertainty
The rebirth, life and dramatic demise of Canadian airborne capability in the form of
the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt) were marked by three things—
uncertainty, anticipation, and political influence. Firstly, there was uncertainty over the
role that the formation 71 was to fulfil in Canadian defence policy from its establishment in
1968 until its disbandment 27 years later. Secondly, there was anticipation by the
Regiment’s members that they would be required to fulfil a role they interpreted as their
own. Thirdly, political expediency influenced many aspects of the Regiment’s existence
from its establishment and operational deployment through to its disbandment. This
section will examine the life of the Cdn AB Regt to determine what role it played within
the Canadian military and national defence policy, and whether or not this role was
justified.
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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