The Canadian Army Journal

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routes. To defeat this enemy 1 RCR, on Op MEDUSA, resorted to several more
conventional means. Breaches were created with heavy armoured bulldozers covered
by air and artillery fires and victory was finally secured through a systematic clearance
of the objective by dismounted infantry. This battle was seen to confirm that a
conventional fight requires conventional tools. 4 In short order, a squadron of Leopard C2
main battle tanks were deployed into Afghanistan. These tanks have since had their
influence impact across Kandahar province. They have proven effective at troop or
squadron level, but always in a combined arms setting. In fact, the necessity of
combined arms in the delivery of decisive combat power is another fundamental which
has been revalidated in Afghanistan. 5
The apparent difference in tactics is in the scale at which they are applied. In the
contemporary operating environment, the smallest effective combat group is the platoon,
and battles are typically platoon fights. However, even in the platoon fight, the company
headquarters is intimately involved in order to coordinate the wide array of higher
combat enablers that are available. The company headquarters must be prepared to
coordinate its own airspace and employ available artillery, close air support (CAS),
attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. Therefore, while so many of the
traditional ways and means have been validated in combat, new methods have also
shown their merit.
Adaptive Dispersed Operations
Successful evolution is seen in the trend of devolving capability to lower levels while
expanding the size of areas of operations (AOs) at each level of command. This
success is developed in the Army’s most recent concept described in Land Operations
2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO). Land Ops 2021 seeks to “create and
sustain operational advantage over adept, adaptive adversaries through the
employment of adaptive land forces alternatively dispersing and aggregating throughout
the multi-dimensional battlespace.” 6 To do this the Army “requires land forces that are
agile, capable of delivering both lethal and non-lethal effects, network-enabled,
multipurpose, and full spectrum capable.” 7
Contiguous and Non-Contiguous Areas of Operation
This force will be employed in an environment in contemporary and future operating
environments where the linear battlefield is likely to remain the exception. The concepts
of “deep” and “rear” will be largely irrelevant as non-contiguous AOs become the norm.
Instead, the vast spaces between dispersed forces will become one large contested
zone that is simultaneously deep and rear. While not stated as such, ADO particularly
balances two principles of war, economy of effort and concentration of force, in order to
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
The Army of Tomorrow; Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for
Land Operations Evolution. May 2006