The Canadian Army Journal

In Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counter-insurgency by Eliot Cohen et
al., many of the prescriptions made by Kilcullen are echoed, although broader principles
are proposed. Of note is the principle of “isolating insurgents from their cause and
support” wherein they argue that “Cutting an insurgency off to die on the vine is easier
than it is to kill every insurgent.” 16 Some methods offered for achieving this aim include
redressing grievances that caused the insurgency, sealing borders and population
control through biometric ID cards. 17 The principles of “legitimacy as the main effort” and
“security under the rule of law” serve to reinforce the isolation of insurgents by redressing
common complaints that often fuel insurgency: corrupt governments and injustice or
insecurity. 18
Many other authors, in studying past COIN campaigns view the isolation of
insurgents from their moral and material support as a key method of defeating an
insurgency. Often repeated is the British approach in Malaya where the use of
resettlement of the population, food control and national ID cards effectively cut off the
Communist insurgents from the majority of their support. 19 Similarly, the French practice
in Algeria of sealing the border and thereby preventing insurgents from gaining access
to safe base areas is another common example. The Morice Line, a 320 km long fence
along the border with Tunisia “…completely stopped insurgent infiltration.” 20 Finally,
instances of limited success by US forces in Vietnam, such as the Special Forces
Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDG) or the US Marine Corps’ Combined Action
Program (CAP), are presented by some authors as highly effective techniques for
combating an insurgency. In both cases, limited numbers of US soldiers and marines
trained, lived and fought with much larger numbers of local indigenous forces. As Robert
M. Cassidy explains, one lesson drawn from the CIDG and CAP experiences was that:
“A modest investment of US forces at the village level can yield major improvements in
local security and intelligence.” 21
The recently released US joint manual FM 3-24 Counter-insurgency is based to a
large extent on the lessons learned from past COIN campaigns as well as the
experiences of the US Army and US Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed
Annex A of the manual is based almost entirely on Kilcullen’s “Twenty-Eight Articles” with
only minor modifications. While much of the manual is focused on COIN campaign
design or intelligence considerations, there are some sections that deal with tacticallevel
counter-insurgency tactics, techniques and procedures. The principal method
proposed is that of “Clear-Hold-Build” whereby a force first clears a geographic area by
destroying, capturing, or forcing the retreat of insurgents within that area. FM 3-24
places an emphasis on the destruction or ‘elimination’ of insurgents in the first phase of
this method, and even recounts the battle of Tal Afar, Iraq in the summer of 2005 where
“…hundreds of insurgents were killed or captured…” as part of the clearance of that
town. 22 The manual also briefly mentions the physical isolation of insurgents through
such means as interdicting their lines of supply or attacking their base areas, although
this theme is not expanded upon. On the other hand, during the ‘Clear’ phase,
commanders are encouraged to provide security for the populace, assist with the reestablishment
of legitimate government, and support development and reconstruction,
thereby winning the populace over and morally isolating the insurgents. 23
The “Hold” is accomplished both through physical security of the population and
infrastructure of the cleared area, and through the creation and maintenance of popular
support for the COIN force and the host-nation government. Host-nation security forces
have a large role to play in both of these objectives and FM 3-24 pays considerable
attention to the development and employment of local forces. In addition to reinforcing
US and coalition soldiers, host-nation security forces potentially offer a considerable
intelligence-gathering capability while also demonstrating the government’s capacity and
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
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