The Canadian Army Journal

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way with the use of his scoped Lee-Enfield. During the barrage, one of the men went
down outside the house and De Lutis broke cover while German shells softened the area
up for their attack. Wounded by splinters from a mortar shell, De Lutis showed no signs
of letting down and reached the wounded man in good time, dragging him to the relative
safety of the farmhouse where he resumed the direction of its defence yet again. 62
Without his courage, leadership, and coolness under fire, the men in the farmhouse
would likely have succumbed to the weight of German attacks, and a result, De Lutis was
granted an immediate Military Medal. 63
In the town itself, it was dawning on
Major Ed Pinkham that his notorious
good luck was indeed running out and
he informed Mitchell that the Germans
occupied barns to the north and the
west and could use any empty building
surrounding Spycker at will. If,
Pinkham argued, reinforcements were
made available immediately to occupy
these structures this could be
prevented, but as current strength was
lacking he concluded that his position
was untenable. 64 With the flooded
conditions only a force of sufficient size
could accomplish this objective and
Pinkham wisely concluded that “it was wasteful” at present to engage in a battle of
attrition with “little gain on our side.” 65 With the western road still closed, the armoured
cars ineffective in the tight streets, and the necessity of maintaining a firm base at
Grande Mille Brugge a going concern, Mitchell could not spare his remaining rifle or
support companies. Under the circumstances, Mitchell proposed to withdraw from the
town and informed Megill, who in turn tasked the Regiment de Maisonneuve to take over
the Black Watch positions. 66 Although the pieces were available at Brigade for the
evacuation, no plan was in place. As mid-afternoon approached, Mitchell requested
ambulance Jeeps be sent up “immediately” but it took time for Brigade to comply; and
there is no indication that any were dispatched at this time. Demonstrably annoyed at
the lack of immediate action at Brigade headquarters, he signalled forty minutes later
that the “situation was not good” and demanded to know “…when can we expect the new
plan?” 67 The delay at Brigade stemmed from the fact that both Brigadier Megill and his
de facto deputy from the 5th Field Regiment, Lt. Col Nighswander, were away from
headquarters visiting other battalions taking part in “Blinder” and nobody could make a
decision either way in the absence. 68 Brigade attempted to re-assure Mitchell, however,
that Megill knew of the problem and that upon his return “shortly,” he would “get (a) plan
up as soon as possible.” This news, however, was little comfort for those still trapped in
Spycker. 69
As daylight faded into night, flames from burning structures in and around the town
illuminated the landscape, but still there was no plan. Sporadic fighting continued in the
town, although it was clear by this time that the Germans were just as exhausted as the
Black Watch; a lull in the fighting right across the front held for the most part with the
exception of quick retort from automatic weapons or the strafing of Mitchell’s
headquarters in the brick plant by Spitfires. 70 Nixon and two local inhabitants of Spycker June 2007
Finally, late in the evening, Brigade had its
plan worked out and Phase One of the relief of the Black Watch by the Regiment de
Maisonneuve commenced at 03:00—33 hours after the initial assault went in.
It took just over five hours to complete the evacuation; men from A Company
escorted Jeep ambulances and stretcher-bearers on foot along the same route used by
C Company two days earlier. This required stealthy precision to avoid alerting the
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
Courtesy of Author