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As far as Pakistan was concerned, the events are best described by author Charles
Allen, who wrote:
General Zia sought to bring the Pathans on-side by encouraging the
establishment of madrassas in the tribal border areas…This was part and
parcel of his program of Islamicisation. 35
Zia’s desires were in some ways the logical outflow of the situation that Pakistan
faced in the early 1970’s. Bangladesh had just separated from their parent country, and
the General no doubt saw a serious threat to the political and geographical integrity of
his nation. By undergoing a deliberate program of Islamicisation he probably hoped to
minimize the nascent threats to Pakistan. 36
The madrassas that were constructed were in the main staffed by members of the
Deobandi sect, which had gradually come into Pakistan from India over the course of the
Twentieth Century. By Allen’s estimate, “65 per cent” of the madrassas in Pakistan “were
directly or indirectly Deobandi” and “of the 1.7 million students…1.25 million were
receiving a Deoband-based education.” 37
The Deobandis take their name from the village in India where their initial madrassa
was founded in the 19th Century. They are “a branch of Sunni Hannafi Islam” 38 which
initially attempted to reconcile “traditional or classical Islam with modern life.” 39 Now
however, the education that is given in the ever expanding network of Deobandi
madrassas can be classed as very conservative and based primarily upon Islamic law
and jurisprudence. 40 Scholar Burnett Rubin has characterized their beliefs as:
[they] reject all forms of ijtihad41… [they] oppose all forms of hierarchy within
the Muslim community, including tribalism or royalty, favour excluding Shia
from participation in the polity, and take a very restrictive view of the social role
of women. All these characteristics of the Indian and Pakistani Deobandis are
found in exaggerated form among the Afghan Taliban. 42
John Esposito has put it more succinctly, arguing that they are “rigid, militant, anti-
American and anti-non-Muslim culture.” 43 He goes on to articulate that this school:
…espoused a myopic, self-contained, militant worldview in which Islam is used
to legitimate [sic] their tribal customs and preferences. The classical Islamic
belief in jihad as a defense of Islam and the Muslim community against
aggression was transformed into a militant jihad culture and worldview that
targets unbelievers, including Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 44
Closely related to the Deobandis, the Wahhabis are a separate but very similar sect
which receives similar national support from Saudi Arabia to that given by Pakistan to
the Deobandis. Wahhabism has “never enjoyed mass support” in the Islamic world,
primarily because, in the words of Charles Allen, it is “rooted in violent intolerance, which
has few charms.” 45 Much like the establishment of the Deobandis, the founder of the
Wahhabis “saw himself as a reformer and revivalist reacting against corruptions inside
Islam.” 46 For him and his adherents the methodology that was to be used was “no more
than [to return to] Islam in its purest, original form.” 47 They are rightly viewed as an
extremist Sunni sect, whose “strict beliefs and interpretations…are not commonly shared
by other Sunni or by Shii…throughout the Muslim world.” 48
It is doubtful that the Wahhabis would continue to exist without the state-sanctioned
support provided by Saudi Arabia. 49 Originally this support was given to the sect within
Saudi Arabia as a response to the secular policies espoused by Nasser in Egypt, and
was undertaken quite deliberately. 50 Looking to counter what was then viewed as a
significant threat to the Islamic population, “Saudi Arabia created stated-financed
international Islamic organizations to promote its Wahhabi-based pan-Islamic vision of
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008