The Canadian Army Journal

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72 One final element which will characterise specific close fire systems is their platform. Platforms range from one or two soldiers carrying weapons up to AFVs and helicopters. These platforms are critical as they enable manoeuvre in close with the enemy. Interestingly, if one looks at the two close fire arms, infantry and armour, there are four characteristics in common and three of these must be balanced in development of the platform. Mobility, firepower and survivability34 must be balanced in each close fire platform. This concept, already established in AFV design, 35 can be shown to be applicable to soldiers as well. Increasing a soldier’s body armour will reduce mobility or limit the amount of firepower which can be carried. Therefore, it is unlikely that all the capabilities required of a close fire system can be carried by a single omni-purpose platform without unacceptably sacrificing survivability or mobility. Instead, capabilities will have to be dispersed across a family of platforms consequently requiring that platforms be considered in the design of a close fire system Within the Army, there exist two close fire systems grouped around broad platform types: dismounted close fire and mounted close fire. A brief examination of these forms will draw out the significance of a system level view to designing a close fire system. M777 provides a far fire capability in Afghanistan Dismounted Close Fire In the concept and design phases, it is important that close fire be considered as a system as opposed to a collection of assorted weapons. Students of the Land Forces Technical Staff Course are regularly presented with anecdotal evidence that the Advanced Lightweight Anti-Armour Weapon System (ALAAWS) project suffered as a result of the Army’s inability to express a coherent dismountable anti-armour concept which showed a need for ALAAWS alongside TOW and the relatively new Eryx. While this judgement may be over-harsh, it is clear that ALAAWS approvals did demand an Army direct fire concept. A better illustration of the need for a system view can be found in the dismounted close fire capability. The dismounted close fire capability is all individual and crewed weapons which can be found in a dismounted infantry company. It is also every dismountable weapon in an Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 Photo Source: Combat Camera
armoured squadron, administration company or MP platoon. In the planned future, dismounted close fire will be transformed under several projects: Small Arms Replacement Project II (SARP II), Advanced Lightweight Anti-Armour Weapon System (ALAAWS) and Close Area Suppression Weapon (CASW). SARP II recognises its scope to include “the pistol, C7 Assault Rifle and associated grenade launcher, C8 Carbine, C9 Light Machine Gun (LMG), C6 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) and other special purpose small arms.” While SARP II will take a system view of a portion of the dismounted close fire capability, a better more comprehensive view is possible. Close and far fire will achieve greatest effects when fed information through greater sensing capabilities. Skylark and company UAVs are a step in this direction Consider that area suppression can be accomplished with machine guns, automatic grenade launchers (ALGs), things in between—the American XM307 Advanced Crew- Served Weapon (ACSW)—and light mortars. Currently there are strong objections within the Infantry Corps to replacing the 60 mm mortars with the CASW despite a comparison of the two weapons which found that in isolation the CASW met far more capability requirements than the 60 mm. The system view would compare aggregate results of platoons and companies incorporating rifles, LMGs, GPMGs, HMGs, VHMGs/ACSWs, AGLs, missiles and light mortars. Only analysis conducted by varying the weapon systems at this aggregate level is able to determine which combination of weapons is optimal and which weapons are essential. Also drawn out of this aggregate analysis are conclusions on force structure such as location and numbers of designated marksmen. Therefore, SARP II should be prepared to examine the full suite of dismounted close fire systems even if it will not replace all such weapons. This will ensure essential capabilities are not “traded off” and that we are not replacing weapon types one for one when it would make more senses to replace two systems for three newer systems (or vice versa). Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 Photo Source: Combat Camera 73
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The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
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EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
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ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
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AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
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Since 1945, only one major expediti
Page 13 and 14:
Casualties It is difficult to deter
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March 1846, in which the insurgency
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French fortified line around the De
Page 19 and 20:
an unsustainable level while using
Page 21 and 22:
The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
Page 23 and 24: The overall resort to a system of d
Page 25 and 26: proposed by researchers like La Cou
Page 27 and 28: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTE
Page 29 and 30: is tempo—the ability of one force
Page 31 and 32: In Principles, Imperatives and Para
Page 33 and 34: Canadian draft placed a significant
Page 35 and 36: to safe havens with the Morice Line
Page 37 and 38: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
Page 39 and 40: Political manoeuvring and military
Page 41 and 42: sustainment air corridors, and to s
Page 43 and 44: offensive capability would be requi
Page 45 and 46: Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
Page 47 and 48: Immediately after the war, there wa
Page 49 and 50: transportable brigade group, includ
Page 51 and 52: spectrum, and included global opera
Page 53 and 54: strung soldiers of the unit adequat
Page 55 and 56: 45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
Page 57 and 58: the super-power of the age. Few gov
Page 59 and 60: By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
Page 61 and 62: ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
Page 63 and 64: obvious abilities is to make a grav
Page 65 and 66: We fight them with schools, educati
Page 67 and 68: TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian
Page 69 and 70: dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72: Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73: Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 77 and 78: system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80: 31. Today, the role of the infantry
Page 81 and 82: somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000
Page 83 and 84: Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86: It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88: increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90: contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92: What has been demonstrated in this
Page 93 and 94: Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96: Concluding Remarks This article has
Page 97 and 98: the engagement of the Canadian Mano
Page 99 and 100: 42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
Page 101 and 102: into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
Page 103 and 104: anks (mostly from the artillery),
Page 105 and 106: Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
Page 107 and 108: town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110: Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112: Canadian Military History (Spring 2
Page 113 and 114: On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116: NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
Page 117 and 118: In the years after 1945 OR became h
Page 119 and 120: narrow application. “If aircraft
Page 121 and 122: assistant” for the military. 34 T
Page 123 and 124: — BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTO
Page 125 and 126:
CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
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as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
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writes that the charge of the 21st
Page 131 and 132:
Reserves the reader could put this
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superiority of numbers to overcome
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A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
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THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
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The Existential Challenge The autho
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D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
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His dispassionate analysis of the b
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PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
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Thankfully, although hard-hitting i
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Chapter Four ends with the death of
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noting he did not fill the requirem
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