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The FLN clearly adjusted its military actions so that they fit into a plan to win
politically and diplomatically from outside Algeria. 51 The FLN also waged a terrorism
campaign inside metropolitan France in 1959-1960 that succeeded in showing that the
war extended beyond the boundaries of Algeria and would continue until France
acquiesced. In 1961, the FLN was able to organize large demonstrations in Paris that
reinforced among the French the sense of hopelessness and protested the
dishonourable ways in which France had conducted military operations. 52 In fact, the
FLN was working on a critical fault line in French society opened by the Indochina
conflict and running through its commitment to colonialism. 53 French society was
profoundly divided, and the war simply widened the existing division, 54 which found its
ultimate illustration when part of the French Army mutinied upon learning that the French
government was negotiating a settlement with the FLN. According to some analysts, it
was the extensive use of reservists and conscripts that brought the war too close to
home and set the political stage for strategic defeat. 55 The Battle of Algiers was perhaps
a political turning point, but it was a continuation of the same tactics that were seen firsthand
by many French citizen-soldiers. French assessments of civilian casualties in
Algeria range between 300,000 and 400,000 deaths, while some Algerian evaluations
can be as high as 1,500,000 deaths.
Lessons Learned
The counter-insurgency effort in Algeria in the 20th century is very instructive. While
effective use of tactical and operational counter-insurgency approaches can lead to
military success, it cannot stave off strategic defeat. The FLN used ambushes, mines
and terrorism as strategic weapons aimed directly at fuelling existing doubts about the
colonial enterprise. France had no strategic response to these attacks. The French
Army made the serious mistake of believing that tactical and operational responses,
supplemented by various attempts to win over the population, would suffice to deal with
the threat posed by the unconventional war that the FLN was waging.
Another important lesson of this conflict is that strong resolve from a country’s
political elite to engage in counter-insurgency is not enough. In democratic states, the
political elite can maintain a show of unity for a time, but in the long run, that unity will
be seriously eroded. This is particularly true in the context of counter-insurgency, which
is almost by definition a type of conflict that endures for years. The use of conscripts
only exacerbates pressures on politicians to pull back from overseas conflicts and
reinforces the widening of the political fault lines that exist in any democratic society.
Discussion
The cases presented above illustrate that in different eras and conflicts, ambushes
and IEDs have been problematic, and various tactical and operational level solutions
have been found and implemented. But in the end, it is the strategic context that has
been determinant. In the 21 st century, Western democracies not only continue to be very
sensitive to any accusations of neo-colonialism or violation of human rights, but they are
now also very sensitive to casualties. For this reason, countering ambushes and IEDs
is not strictly speaking a military issue, although it occurs in a military context and calls
for the use of military means. To deal with such threats effectively, one must understand
that they relate directly to the political and social realms, which are the real targets of
ambush and IED campaigns mounted by insurgents. Tactics such as ambushes and
IEDs are used by insurgents to gradually sap the foreign counter-insurgency forces’
political will, and to destabilize the social foundations of the political regime that the
counterinsurgents are trying to establish and protect. If counter-ambush and counter-
IED efforts remain at the tactical and operational levels, then the insurgents can keep the
strategic initiative. Our inability to fully integrate counter-ambush and counter-IED
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 19