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48 Even prior to the Regiment’s establishment some senior leaders in Mobile Command were not convinced that an airborne capability was required to fill a Canadian military role. While this could be attributed to a natural aversion to change, 72 it has also been argued that the concept was not well thought out. Dr. Bercuson, a well respected expert on politics, defence policy, and military history, believes that: There was and is a real argument that although a modern, all-round military ought to retain some airborne capability, a unit such as the Canadian Airborne Regiment was operationally obsolete from the day it was formed. 73 Paul Hellyer and General Allard, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), believed that their ideas for a strategic response capability in the form of the Cdn AB Regt were innovative but, in fact, the U.S. had been developing these ideas throughout the 1950s. 74 The problem with this misconception was unfortunately more than simple hubris; it led Canada to create a capability that had been overcome by the advent and perfection of the helicopter. Helicopters allowed troops to be more quickly, effectively and accurately delivered to a landing zone with more supplies and equipment than a parachute drop. Helicopters were vulnerable to ground fire approaching the target but the same was true for parachute drops at 300 to 500 meters. Finally, helicopters were also capable of evacuating wounded and providing close fire support to troops on the ground. 75 So, at a time when airborne forces were becoming obsolete and pressures existed to reduce defence spending, the question remains—Did Canada create the Cdn AB Regt to fulfil a perceived role, or were other factors at play? The answer is, quite simply, that other factors were at play, and these factors were to lay the foundation for much of the uncertainty, anticipation and political influence that was to occur throughout the existence of the Cdn AB Regt. Dr. Bercuson has described five factors that influenced the creation of the Cdn AB Regt: low morale, the Army’s fixation on parachuting, the belief that paratroopers were the essence of combat-ready soldiers, the perceived need for some sort of anti-terrorist or anti-guerrilla force and, finally, cost. The first factor—low morale—was a result of organizational changes to the Canadian Forces due to plans Paul Hellyer was introducing that struck units from the order of battle and reduced available resources. The next two factors are certainly understandable given the Canadian experience with paratroopers during The Second World War. Military leaders thought that a parachute capability would improve morale and provide a core of combat-ready soldiers. The fourth factor was a function of Canadian military leaders wanting a force comparable to the Special Forces that the US and Britain were developing76 in order to be part of the club. Cost was, however, the driving factor. Airborne forces were not cheap, especially when the cost of transport aircraft and their associated infrastructure were considered, but they were less expensive than an investment in helicopters dedicated to airmobile forces. 77 The airlift required by airborne forces could be used for multiple purposes when not dropping paratroopers, whereas helicopters dedicated to airmobile forces would serve a specific purpose. Therefore, Canada outwardly decided to create the Cdn AB Regt to provide a strategic response capability but, in reality, the decision was politically expedient as it satisfied the widest range of diverse requirements with the least possible cost. The major problem arising from creating a politically expedient force is that the role it was to fulfil was not clearly defined at the outset. As a result, the first commander of this new formation, Colonel Rochester, was directed to develop an operating concept from guidance that was too general and far-reaching in nature. This guidance, issued by the Army Commander, directed that the Regiment conduct tasks ranging from the defence of Canada, peacekeeping, and disaster relief to special forces missions and coup de main in general war. As a result, the operational concept encompassed a broad Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
spectrum, and included global operational environments and a full range of potential adversaries. 78 The uncertainty over the role the Regiment was to play made it difficult to focus training, to justify expenditures within the organization as satisfying the national interest, and to adequately fulfil tasks across a broad spectrum when required. The Early Successes and The Road to Decline The early years of the Cdn AB Regt were exceptional, but it was to reach the height of its existence in the early 1970s. 79 The formation consisted of the highest quality volunteers from across the Army and they conducted challenging training that further honed the skills of these motivated individuals. The Regiment travelled extensively to train and was even considered as favoured within the Army. This was in part due the Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008 Combat camera VH2007-0012-048 49
Page 1 and 2: The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
Page 5 and 6: EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
Page 7 and 8: ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
Page 9 and 10: AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
Page 11 and 12: Since 1945, only one major expediti
Page 13 and 14: Casualties It is difficult to deter
Page 15 and 16: March 1846, in which the insurgency
Page 17 and 18: French fortified line around the De
Page 19 and 20: an unsustainable level while using
Page 21 and 22: The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
Page 23 and 24: The overall resort to a system of d
Page 25 and 26: proposed by researchers like La Cou
Page 27 and 28: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTE
Page 29 and 30: is tempo—the ability of one force
Page 31 and 32: In Principles, Imperatives and Para
Page 33 and 34: Canadian draft placed a significant
Page 35 and 36: to safe havens with the Morice Line
Page 37 and 38: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
Page 39 and 40: Political manoeuvring and military
Page 41 and 42: sustainment air corridors, and to s
Page 43 and 44: offensive capability would be requi
Page 45 and 46: Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
Page 47 and 48: Immediately after the war, there wa
Page 49: transportable brigade group, includ
Page 53 and 54: strung soldiers of the unit adequat
Page 55 and 56: 45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
Page 57 and 58: the super-power of the age. Few gov
Page 59 and 60: By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
Page 61 and 62: ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
Page 63 and 64: obvious abilities is to make a grav
Page 65 and 66: We fight them with schools, educati
Page 67 and 68: TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian
Page 69 and 70: dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72: Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73 and 74: Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 75 and 76: armoured squadron, administration c
Page 77 and 78: system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80: 31. Today, the role of the infantry
Page 81 and 82: somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000
Page 83 and 84: Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86: It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88: increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90: contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92: What has been demonstrated in this
Page 93 and 94: Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96: Concluding Remarks This article has
Page 97 and 98: the engagement of the Canadian Mano
Page 99 and 100: 42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
Page 101 and 102:
into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
Page 103 and 104:
anks (mostly from the artillery),
Page 105 and 106:
Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
Page 107 and 108:
town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110:
Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112:
Canadian Military History (Spring 2
Page 113 and 114:
On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116:
NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
Page 117 and 118:
In the years after 1945 OR became h
Page 119 and 120:
narrow application. “If aircraft
Page 121 and 122:
assistant” for the military. 34 T
Page 123 and 124:
— BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTO
Page 125 and 126:
CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
Page 127 and 128:
as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
Page 129 and 130:
writes that the charge of the 21st
Page 131 and 132:
Reserves the reader could put this
Page 133 and 134:
superiority of numbers to overcome
Page 135 and 136:
A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
Page 137 and 138:
THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
Page 139 and 140:
The Existential Challenge The autho
Page 141 and 142:
D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
Page 143 and 144:
His dispassionate analysis of the b
Page 145 and 146:
PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
Page 147 and 148:
Thankfully, although hard-hitting i
Page 149 and 150:
Chapter Four ends with the death of
Page 151 and 152:
noting he did not fill the requirem
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