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38. Rashid, 88. 39. Esposito, 110. 40. Burnett R. Rubin, 81-82. 41. The use of reason to create innovation in sharia in response to new conditions. From Burnett R. Rubin, 82. 42. Ibid, 82. 43. Esposito, 16. 44. Esposito, 16. 45. Allen, 21. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid, 20. 48. Esposito, 106. 49. It warrants note that the Saudi royal family are adherents to this sect of Islam. 50. Esposito, 106. 51. Espositio, 107. 52. Ibid, 108. 53. Eric S. Margolis, War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan and Asia (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2001), 58-59. 54. Fisk, 31. 55. Michael Rubin, 11-12. 56. Ibid, 5. 57. Ibid, 7. 58. Burnett R. Rubin, 85. 59. Burnett R. Rubin, 85. 60. Sean M. Maloney, Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan (Washington: Potomac Books, 2007), 205. 61. Ibid. 62. Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2005), 240. 63. Charles H Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder and Kalev I. Sepp, Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2003), 24. 64. Maloney, 166. 65. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century (St Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), 2. 66. Sean Maloney for example has argued that they have fought in urban centres “using terrorist tactics.” See Maloney, 166. 67. As based on the author’s personal experiences within Afghanistan as the Deputy Commanding Officer of the 1 PPCLI Battle Group from February to August 2006 in the Kandahar Province. 68. Again, based on personal experiences fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. 69. Gannon, 56. 70. Note, I am not arguing for eradication of poppy without both financial incentive and an alternative crop; to do so is akin to arming the farmer and pointing him in the direction of the closest coalition base. 71. For an eloquent, if somewhat humorous, argument for this approach, please see Bill Maher’s When You Ride Alone You Ride With Bin Laden. (Bill Maher, When You Ride Alone You Ride With Bin Laden: What the Government SHOULD Be Telling Us to Help Fight the War on Terrorism (Beverly Hills: New Millenium Press, 2002). 72. Hammes, 159. 73. Ibid, 256. 74. Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians (New York: Random House, 2003), 272. 75. Maloney, 216. 64 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian A. McGregor The current doctrine on firepower employment1 is generally still sound, but a few deficiencies create a temptation to substitute other concepts for portions of the doctrine. Further, current doctrine may contribute to a “tendency to simply upgrade existing systems and/or replace platforms with newer versions” 2 because the doctrinal divisions of firepower are not capability and effects focused. Since the Army is pursuing several major projects that will deliver or incorporate new firepower systems, now is an appropriate time to modernize firepower doctrine in the Canadian Forces so that it may play its “vital role” 3 in determining appropriate structure and equipment. Modernisation of firepower doctrine does not require sweeping changes. Building from the existing concepts of organic firepower and fire support, the Army can transition to more descriptive concepts of close fire and far fire. The 1999 Firepower doctrine can be made more relevant as the Army grows toward the future by drawing on lessons from current operational experience and building on doctrinal changes of the last five years. In getting to this revised doctrine, it is important to look at the lessons of the Army today. Current Operational Lessons In February 2006, the 1 PPCLI Battle Group (known as Task Force ORION) took control of the Kandahar Province from the American TF GUN DEVIL. This marked the start of much higher intensity combat operations in that area. There have now been three BGs to complete tours during this new phase, and a fourth BG is nearing the end of its tour. Combat lessons are validating or correcting many assumptions about current and potential operational environments and concepts. We have met the enemy and in many ways found the asymmetric foe we had anticipated. The enemy does attempt to hide in the civilian community, to strike only under favourable conditions, to use constricting terrain and to disengage when a position becomes untenable. Yet, even in this environment, our soldiers still require the ability to fight in a conventional context. The enemy will carefully establish fighting positions with interlocking fields of fire, depth positions, and cut-off locations. Kill zones will be established so that the massed fire of RPG, PKM and AK-47 achieve the maximum effects on ambushed coalition forces. This enemy is being fought in what is being described as “complex terrain.” This is repeatedly seen to be a dense network of walled compounds connected with trails and passageways, deep irrigation ditches, and dense vineyards. Both 1 PPCLI BG and 1 RCR BG have identified that, despite the rural nature of the ground, tactics, techniques and procedures developed for urban combat are proving to be applicable and very effective. Other long established and well understood basic war fighting tenets remain applicable to the COE (Contemporary Operating Environment). The notions of fire and movement, flank security, use of cut-offs in the attack and fighting out of an ambush were specifically mentioned as remaining relevant. In counter insurgency, the fundamentals of combat have not changed at the section, platoon or company level. The fundamentals have also been validated in more conventional fights. In Pashmul, the Taliban attempted a conventional stand. The determined enemy sited entrenched fighting positions and used IEDs covered by direct fire to deny wheeled Captain Ian A. McGregor, ‘Tomorrow’s Firepower’ Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 (Spring 2008), 65-77 65
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The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
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EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
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ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
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AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
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Since 1945, only one major expediti
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Casualties It is difficult to deter
Page 15 and 16: March 1846, in which the insurgency
Page 17 and 18: French fortified line around the De
Page 19 and 20: an unsustainable level while using
Page 21 and 22: The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
Page 23 and 24: The overall resort to a system of d
Page 25 and 26: proposed by researchers like La Cou
Page 27 and 28: MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTE
Page 29 and 30: is tempo—the ability of one force
Page 31 and 32: In Principles, Imperatives and Para
Page 33 and 34: Canadian draft placed a significant
Page 35 and 36: to safe havens with the Morice Line
Page 37 and 38: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
Page 39 and 40: Political manoeuvring and military
Page 41 and 42: sustainment air corridors, and to s
Page 43 and 44: offensive capability would be requi
Page 45 and 46: Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
Page 47 and 48: Immediately after the war, there wa
Page 49 and 50: transportable brigade group, includ
Page 51 and 52: spectrum, and included global opera
Page 53 and 54: strung soldiers of the unit adequat
Page 55 and 56: 45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
Page 57 and 58: the super-power of the age. Few gov
Page 59 and 60: By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
Page 61 and 62: ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
Page 63 and 64: obvious abilities is to make a grav
Page 65: We fight them with schools, educati
Page 69 and 70: dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72: Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73 and 74: Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 75 and 76: armoured squadron, administration c
Page 77 and 78: system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80: 31. Today, the role of the infantry
Page 81 and 82: somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000
Page 83 and 84: Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86: It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88: increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90: contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92: What has been demonstrated in this
Page 93 and 94: Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96: Concluding Remarks This article has
Page 97 and 98: the engagement of the Canadian Mano
Page 99 and 100: 42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
Page 101 and 102: into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
Page 103 and 104: anks (mostly from the artillery),
Page 105 and 106: Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
Page 107 and 108: town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110: Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112: Canadian Military History (Spring 2
Page 113 and 114: On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116: NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
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In the years after 1945 OR became h
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narrow application. “If aircraft
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assistant” for the military. 34 T
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— BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTO
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CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
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as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
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writes that the charge of the 21st
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Reserves the reader could put this
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superiority of numbers to overcome
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A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
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THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
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The Existential Challenge The autho
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D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
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His dispassionate analysis of the b
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PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
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Thankfully, although hard-hitting i
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Chapter Four ends with the death of
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noting he did not fill the requirem
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