The Canadian Army Journal

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dissipate the strength of an advancing enemy force. Unlike other channel ports the
Canadians experienced, the commander of the Dunkirk Garrison (General Von Kluge)
promoted an aggressive defence and demonstrated an eager willingness to fight to the
last. 16 Despite the fact that he allowed French civilians to flee the quarantined city,
Canadian intelligence revealed a strengthening of the outposts—including the village of
Spycker used by the Germans as a base to bring fire down on the Grande Mille Brugge
area. 17 In response, Foulkes ordered 5th Brigade to clear these outposts and the Black
Watch were instructed to capture Spycker as part of an operation known as “Blinder.” 18
The last time the medieval village of Spycker experienced fighting was during the
evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940 when it served as an outpost for French forces defending
to the last. During that time the village witnessed bitter fighting and the barbarism of war;
including the execution of French soldiers at the hands of the Nazis and the destruction
and deprivation of the long occupation. Four years later, the tables were turned and the
Germans utilized the village as a base for forward observation of the road leading from
Grande Mille Brugge to Bourgbourgville and a hub for fighting patrols. 19 Surrounding the
town, a series of small farms buildings provided the Germans with bases for sniping or
re-infiltration, and reports from company-sized patrols on consecutive nights indicated
heavier German forces in Spycker than previously thought. 20 As it was clear that the
German defenders were reorganizing a “fairly strong force” in the vicinity, the attack was
laid on for last light of September 12th . Due to other commitments along the canal, the
Black Watch commanding officer (CO), Lt. Col. Frank Mitchell, could not commit all four
rifle companies to the attack; instead, B and C companies, under the command of Majors
Alan Carmichael and Ed Pinkham respectively, drew the short straws.
Widely considered the best company commander the Black Watch had to offer,
Carmichael “had a very good approach at O groups—very simple, not complicated …he
was able to pick the right officers for the job…he had his intelligence, then he transmitted
that intelligence to us.” 21 Pinkham on other hand did not command the same respect as
his counterpart as one fellow company commander recalled: “he was not the best officer
but everyone wanted to be in his company.” 22 Known for his great fortune rather than his
talent, his acerbic wit and self-aggrandising style did not sit well with some, but none
could deny that what he lacked in tactical skill he more than made up for in luck—and
after the experiences of the previous summer, some believed that the latter formed the
crucial element in battle. 23
Carmichael’s company had a taste of Spycker during the night of the 11th when they
pushed into the town only to be forced to back by a heavy German counter-attack. 24
Although casualties in B Company were negligible, heavy losses sustained over the
previous weeks, coupled with little rest and reorganization and inexperienced
reinforcements, meant both companies would go into battle under strength with sections
numbering 4 or 5 instead of the prescribed 8-10. 25
The battle for Spycker marked the beginning of a dark chapter for the Canadian
Army as it pertained to reinforcements. As the Black Watch suffered 97% casualties in
their July 25th attack on Verrieres Ridge, and a further 40% ten days later in a prelude to
Operation Totalize, they found themselves at the sharp end of an unprepossessing
problem that plagued the Canadian effort in North West Europe during the fall of 1944. 26
The first sign that reinforcements were inadequately trained came on the heels of the
Verrieres debacle when an exasperated Frank Mitchell wrote: “Typical story is the lad
who saw the invasion pictures of D-Day…thought the time had come to join up and was
killed at May-sur-Orne on 5 August—we got them with 6 to 8 weeks total service. We
had an accident last week; man changing a Bren gun did not know you could take the
magazine off. Do you wonder that we become balder and greyer…” 27 According to
Carmichael, who taught tactics for eight months at No 4 CTS, the reinforcements in the
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008