The Canadian Army Journal

TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER
Captain Ian A. McGregor
The current doctrine on firepower employment1 is generally still sound, but a few
deficiencies create a temptation to substitute other concepts for portions of the doctrine.
Further, current doctrine may contribute to a “tendency to simply upgrade existing
systems and/or replace platforms with newer versions” 2 because the doctrinal divisions
of firepower are not capability and effects focused. Since the Army is pursuing several
major projects that will deliver or incorporate new firepower systems, now is an
appropriate time to modernize firepower doctrine in the Canadian Forces so that it may
play its “vital role” 3 in determining appropriate structure and equipment.
Modernisation of firepower doctrine does not require sweeping changes. Building
from the existing concepts of organic firepower and fire support, the Army can transition
to more descriptive concepts of close fire and far fire. The 1999 Firepower doctrine can
be made more relevant as the Army grows toward the future by drawing on lessons from
current operational experience and building on doctrinal changes of the last five years.
In getting to this revised doctrine, it is important to look at the lessons of the Army today.
Current Operational Lessons
In February 2006, the 1 PPCLI Battle Group (known as Task Force ORION) took
control of the Kandahar Province from the American TF GUN DEVIL. This marked the
start of much higher intensity combat operations in that area. There have now been
three BGs to complete tours during this new phase, and a fourth BG is nearing the end
of its tour. Combat lessons are validating or correcting many assumptions about current
and potential operational environments and concepts.
We have met the enemy and in many ways found the asymmetric foe we had
anticipated. The enemy does attempt to hide in the civilian community, to strike only
under favourable conditions, to use constricting terrain and to disengage when a position
becomes untenable. Yet, even in this environment, our soldiers still require the ability to
fight in a conventional context. The enemy will carefully establish fighting positions with
interlocking fields of fire, depth positions, and cut-off locations. Kill zones will be
established so that the massed fire of RPG, PKM and AK-47 achieve the maximum
effects on ambushed coalition forces.
This enemy is being fought in what is being described as “complex terrain.” This is
repeatedly seen to be a dense network of walled compounds connected with trails and
passageways, deep irrigation ditches, and dense vineyards. Both 1 PPCLI BG and 1
RCR BG have identified that, despite the rural nature of the ground, tactics, techniques
and procedures developed for urban combat are proving to be applicable and very
effective. Other long established and well understood basic war fighting tenets remain
applicable to the COE (Contemporary Operating Environment). The notions of fire and
movement, flank security, use of cut-offs in the attack and fighting out of an ambush were
specifically mentioned as remaining relevant. In counter insurgency, the fundamentals
of combat have not changed at the section, platoon or company level.
The fundamentals have also been validated in more conventional fights. In
Pashmul, the Taliban attempted a conventional stand. The determined enemy sited
entrenched fighting positions and used IEDs covered by direct fire to deny wheeled
Captain Ian A. McGregor, ‘Tomorrow’s Firepower’
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 (Spring 2008), 65-77 65