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40. Kelly. Lost Soldiers, pp. 168-169. 41. According to Jean-Paul Mari, in an article in the Nouvel Observateur of 28 February 2002. 42. According to Jean-Paul Mari on Internet at http://www.grands-reporters.com/Guerre-d-Algerie-Les-derniers.html, consulted 23 October 2007. 43. Alexander and Keiger. “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, operations and diplomacy”, p. 8. 44. In the unofficial history of the 4 e Régiment de chasseurs, one can read that by 1960 even when the French Army ceased major operations, “Le Régiment s’adapte rapidement. Il prend un rythme de vie particulier: vivre la nuit. Car c’est à la faveur de l’obscurité que se manifestent les tentatives de l’adversaire: approche du réseau à dessein de le saboter ou d’installer des embuscades, essais de franchissement, et aussi harcèlement. Ces derniers ne seront jamais très dangereux, mais bazookas et mines nous causeront des pertes. ” On Internet at http://www.4rch.fr/images/imagehistorique_l/historique_l.htm, consulted 21 November 2007. 45. Alexander and Keiger. “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, operations and diplomacy”, p. 9. 46. Kelly. Lost Soldiers, p. 181. 47. For more details see Guelton, Frederic. “The French Army’s ‘Centre for Instruction and Preparation in Counter- Guerrilla warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew.” 48. Kelly. Lost Soldiers, p. 176-179. 49. Alexander and Keiger. “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, operations and diplomacy”, p. 14. 50 . Alexander and Keiger. “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, operations and diplomacy”, p. 15. 51. Kelly. Lost Soldiers, p. 171. 52. Kelly. Lost Soldiers, p. 240. 53. Kelly. Lost Soldiers, p. 250. 54. Already in 1956, a quarter of the French population believed that Algeria would not remain French. Polls quoted in Merom, “The social origins of the French capitulation in Algeria”, p. 615. 55. Merom. “The social origins of the French capitulation in Algeria”, p. 618. 56. Callwell. Small Wars, p. 143. 57. Callwell. Small Wars, p. 127. 58. Blank. Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 1979-90, p. 50. 59. Ghosh, Bobby and Mark Thompson. “The enemy’s new tools.” Time (25 June 2007), p. 26. 60. Demarest and Grau. “Maginot Line or Fort Apache,” p. 35. 61. Church. “Assuring mobility in a COIN environment,” pp. 22-23. 24 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
MANOEUVRE WARFARE THEORY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE Major Alex D. Haynes, CD With much of the Western world embroiled in counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), a considerable debate on how to wage these wars is taking place within Western militaries, academia and governments. The intensity and urgency of this discussion are reflective of the general lack of preparedness within those militaries for this type of war, despite the prevalence of insurgencies during the Cold War. 1 Much of the intellectual and material preparation since the late 1980s had focussed on fighting high-tech, midintensity wars against opposing conventional armies and almost no attention was paid to preparing for what are often referred to as low-intensity conflicts. Operations Desert Storm in Iraq and Allied Force in Serbia only served to reinforce the belief among Western military professionals that future wars would be characterized by all-seeing sensors cueing precision weapons with almost no need for “boots on the ground” except as a constabulary force after the enemy had capitulated. However, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have turned these predictions on their heads, with Western armies discovering that high-tech sensors and munitions are of much less use in COIN campaigns. This has resulted in a rushed effort to develop principles, techniques and theories for the conduct of COIN campaigns. Often, comparisons are made to past COIN efforts in Vietnam, Malaya, Algeria or Kenya in an attempt to glean long-forgotten, or even ignored, lessons from those wars. 2 On the other hand, lower-level commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan have written about techniques and principles that were developed and refined in theatre, usually by trial and error. Both the US and Canada have recently produced draft COIN manuals based on the requirement to educate and train their armies in this rediscovered form of warfare that are based in large part on historical comparisons and experience from the field. This considerable effort, while necessary, may risk throwing the baby out with the bath water. Put another way: is it really necessary to start from scratch when developing COIN doctrine? Are insurgencies so vastly different from conventional wars that none of the principles or techniques from the latter could be applied to the former? Since the 1980s, many Western armies have chosen to adopt ‘manoeuvre warfare’ as the basis for their doctrine. Although hardly a new concept, manoeuvre warfare was seen as an antidote to theories that emphasized attrition, and presented a more economical, dynamic approach to warfare akin to the German blitzkrieg of the Second World War. The key to manoeuvre warfare, as expressed by proponents like William Lind and Robert Leonhard, was the defeat of the enemy by attacking his critical vulnerability rather than going toe-to-toe with his strength. By the mid 1990s, most Western armies had converted to this school of thought, at least in their doctrine manuals, and were teaching their young officers the principles and techniques of this ‘new’ form of warfare. However, since only recently adopting this new theory, Western armies are faced with insurgencies rather than mid to high-intensity wars. Does this mean that manoeuvre warfare theory is no longer valid or applicable? This essay will attempt to answer this question by first defining manoeuvre warfare theory and COIN theory as they exist today, and then determining if the former is in any way applicable to the latter. The intent is to examine whether the campaigns of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) do necessitate starting from scratch with regards to doctrine. Major Alex D. Haynes, ‘Manoeuvre Warfare Theory and Counter-insurgency Doctrine’ Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 (Spring 2008), 25-34 25
Page 1 and 2: The The Canadian Canadian Army Army
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial—Soldi
Page 5 and 6: EDITORIAL—SOLDIERS AS WRITERS Maj
Page 7 and 8: ARMY UPDATE—THE JADEX PAPERS Back
Page 9 and 10: AMBUSHES, IEDS AND COIN: THE FRENCH
Page 11 and 12: Since 1945, only one major expediti
Page 13 and 14: Casualties It is difficult to deter
Page 15 and 16: March 1846, in which the insurgency
Page 17 and 18: French fortified line around the De
Page 19 and 20: an unsustainable level while using
Page 21 and 22: The FLN clearly adjusted its milita
Page 23 and 24: The overall resort to a system of d
Page 25: proposed by researchers like La Cou
Page 29 and 30: is tempo—the ability of one force
Page 31 and 32: In Principles, Imperatives and Para
Page 33 and 34: Canadian draft placed a significant
Page 35 and 36: to safe havens with the Morice Line
Page 37 and 38: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN AIRBORNE FOR
Page 39 and 40: Political manoeuvring and military
Page 41 and 42: sustainment air corridors, and to s
Page 43 and 44: offensive capability would be requi
Page 45 and 46: Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spr
Page 47 and 48: Immediately after the war, there wa
Page 49 and 50: transportable brigade group, includ
Page 51 and 52: spectrum, and included global opera
Page 53 and 54: strung soldiers of the unit adequat
Page 55 and 56: 45. Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile
Page 57 and 58: the super-power of the age. Few gov
Page 59 and 60: By 7 December 2001, the Taliban had
Page 61 and 62: ideology.” 51 With the overthrow
Page 63 and 64: obvious abilities is to make a grav
Page 65 and 66: We fight them with schools, educati
Page 67 and 68: TOMORROW’S FIREPOWER Captain Ian
Page 69 and 70: dominate the much larger and more c
Page 71 and 72: Even new terminology fails to re-es
Page 73 and 74: Effects Oriented. A complete close
Page 75 and 76: armoured squadron, administration c
Page 77 and 78:
system. However, the development of
Page 79 and 80:
31. Today, the role of the infantry
Page 81 and 82:
somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000
Page 83 and 84:
Definitions Before moving on to try
Page 85 and 86:
It is already clear that consensus
Page 87 and 88:
increase in the levels of global co
Page 89 and 90:
contracting of MPFs to provide arme
Page 91 and 92:
What has been demonstrated in this
Page 93 and 94:
Domestic regulation in the US has t
Page 95 and 96:
Concluding Remarks This article has
Page 97 and 98:
the engagement of the Canadian Mano
Page 99 and 100:
42. Isenberg, A Fistful of Contract
Page 101 and 102:
into Belgium, General Charles Foulk
Page 103 and 104:
anks (mostly from the artillery),
Page 105 and 106:
Shot from vantage point of Nixon in
Page 107 and 108:
town. Following this, the much-cele
Page 109 and 110:
Germans as to what was happening. F
Page 111 and 112:
Canadian Military History (Spring 2
Page 113 and 114:
On 1 August 1944, Major Dextraze co
Page 115 and 116:
NOTE TO FILE—REACHING INTO THE OR
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In the years after 1945 OR became h
Page 119 and 120:
narrow application. “If aircraft
Page 121 and 122:
assistant” for the military. 34 T
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— BOOK REVIEWS — TERRIBLE VICTO
Page 125 and 126:
CALEPIN D’ESPOIR DUFRESNE, Daniel
Page 127 and 128:
as a “Villa Rogati dwelling” (p
Page 129 and 130:
writes that the charge of the 21st
Page 131 and 132:
Reserves the reader could put this
Page 133 and 134:
superiority of numbers to overcome
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A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH WAR—ENDIN
Page 137 and 138:
THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDA
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The Existential Challenge The autho
Page 141 and 142:
D-DAY: JUNO BEACH, CANADA’S 24 HO
Page 143 and 144:
His dispassionate analysis of the b
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PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: NEW PLAY
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Thankfully, although hard-hitting i
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Chapter Four ends with the death of
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noting he did not fill the requirem
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