The Canadian Army Journal

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Not all support for either the regime or the insurgency comes from foreign states,
and, as mentioned above, the provision of drugs, specifically opium, does provide a
source of revenue as well. When they initially took power, the Taliban made overtures
to the international community wherein they would eliminate the growing of poppy, and
thus the provision of much of the world’s heroin. This has been viewed as nothing more
than a “negotiating card” by some authors. 60 As noted by Sean Maloney, this ploy
actually served to encourage poppy growers, by both driving up the world price for the
product and by forcing them to pay a tax for the privilege of growing the flower. 61 Others,
like Robert Kaplan and Charles Briscoe have been equally blunt, with Kaplan asserting
that drugs contribute directly to the funds available to the Taliban, 62 while Briscoe states
that “the reality was that opium consumption helped finance the fighting necessary for
the Taliban to gain control of the country.” 63 There is no reason to believe that this
situation has changed now that the Taliban has lost power in Afghanistan.
When the American military began their campaign, which ultimately lead to the
destruction of the Taliban government, the Taliban was able to conduct operations at
“company and battalion” sized levels. However, by the “late spring of 2002” they had
“ceased to be a tangible entity” beyond platoon-sized organizations. 64 This the result of
encounters with American air power and special forces assets. Since that time, the
Taliban have adopted a “Fourth Generation Warfare” approach to the conduct of
operations; this is the only reasonable response to the overwhelming conventional
military superiority resident in the American military and that of their allies on the ground
in Afghanistan. 65
Though some have argued that the current tactics employed by the Taliban are
those of the terrorist, 66 this is a bit of a mischaracterization, in that the means being
employed against the NATO coalition within Afghanistan do not generally seem aimed at
terrorizing the local populace. Instead, they should be viewed as demonstrating, to both
the Afghans and the coalition, that the environment is far from secure and that the Karzai
government is ineffective in meeting the basic needs of its people. There have been
numerous incidents, such as the burning of schools and the killing of local leaders and
teachers67 that do aim to terrorize the Afghan people, but to refer to the Taliban as
terrorists may verge on hyperbole.
At the tactical level, the Taliban fighters have consistently demonstrated skills and
abilities warranting their respect as an adversary. Although relying on a mixture of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers and ambushes, they continually
display the ability to adapt and innovate, countering coalition tactics, techniques and
procedures in a manner that clearly shows their ability to learn through the execution of
operations. Further, their ability to police a battlefield, thus depriving coalition forces of
intelligence, while also caring for their own wounded and dead belies a level of
sophistication well beyond that which might be expected. 68
They make excellent use of modern means of communications, including the
cellular phone and the ICOM radio, coupling it with remarkably capable observation
networks which serve to monitor coalition movements and necessitating the
incorporation of deception into friendly tactical planning. In some ways their embracing
of technology can be viewed as ironic, for although their aim might be to return to a more
fundamentalist version of Islam, they do not seem afraid of using modern tools in
obtaining their prize.
They are a cunning and creative enemy, who possess many of the traits that should
engender a respect for their capabilities from their enemies within the coalition. Their
understanding of fourth generation war, and information operations on an international
scale, is in many ways superior to our own. To underestimate them and ignore their
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008