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Guideline 3: Develop partnerships with non-traditional allies; solutions may not
always involve the application of force
Dr Lindsey used the example of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan to illustrate
this guideline. Operations in Afghanistan draw attention to the requirement of “knowing
the enemy,” including its capabilities and intentions, and to planning operations on the
footbed of good intelligence. He suggested that the situation in Afghanistan seems more
confused than it should be, and that the CF could do more in Afghanistan by developing
partnerships with non-traditional allies: “Maybe the solution lies outside the military. For
example, can we find out what the ‘good’ Muslims think about the situation; those who
do not want to get blown up and are interested in problem solving?” 28 He suggested that
Muslim communities participate in discussions regarding governance challenges with
the Government of Canada, which would facilitate our ability to understand what the
requirements of the local population, the local security forces and their need, versus
telling them what we are going to do to them if they do not cooperate. This, he argued,
would be an active area of research for psychologists or those involved in personal
behaviour analysis. 29
With the importance of sending the right people (not just armed forces) to prosecute
a counter-insurgency campaign being recognized as common to successful counterinsurgencies,
30 Dr Lindsey maintained that Canadian police and constabulary forces,
such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), could be used to support more
tasks and reinforce the mission. In addition, Dr Lindsey suggested that there is a need
to examine the system of trust, and understand on the nature of the counter-insurgency
in Afghanistan, including its cultural, political and geographic context: “The mistake by
the US in Iraq was that they abolished the army after they invaded. We need to find out
more on how to support Afghan locals, not look down at them through the barrel of a
gun.” 31 Canada’s strategy in Afghanistan is based upon assisting and enabling the
Afghan people to rebuild their country along three ‘pillars’ of activity that are consistent
with the “Afghan Compact,” namely Security, Governance (rule of law, Human Rights)
and Economic and Social Development. 32 This reinforces the notion that military
operations are part of a coordinated and integrated approach among communities
responsible for diplomacy, defence and development.
Guideline 4: Synthesize the “so what” of emerging issues, concepts and
technologies
In a 1950s issue of the Canadian Army Journal, Dr Lindsey wrote an article on “The
Roles of Radar.” The purpose of this article was to outline the basic relationships that
determined the performance of a radar set, and to show how many of the features
conflict with each other. 33 But the role of the analyst is much larger than this: he must be
able to articulate emerging developments in science and technology (S&T), changes in
the geo-political environment and strategic concepts in such a way as to highlight the
potential opportunities, limitations and implications in the context of military
requirements. Extending the scientific frontiers of knowledge is not always a mandatory
requirement for influencing the military combat development process or field operations.
While OR analyses must be timely and relevant, lengthy dissertations are not required
for problems requiring an immediate answer. In other words, it is not necessary to
develop a program when all that is required is a ‘quick-look’ assessment.
Besides acting as a “strategic sensor” in tracking and monitoring emerging
developments and trends, one of the roles of the OR analyst is to realize the potential
application of a new subject, acting as what Dr Lindsey referred to as an “education
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008