The Canadian Army Journal

Effects Oriented. A complete close fire capability is provided by a suite of
weapons capable of achieving all required target effects at all required ranges
in spite of obstacles. These effects are both lethal and non-lethal, and they
encompass destroy, suppress, neutralize and disrupt. No single weapon will
meet all these needs against all targets and so a complete close fire capability
must be a system of systems. The effectiveness of a close fire system is
assessed at the aggregate level where all systems contribute to the capability
required for a manoeuvre force to engage a spectrum of possible targets.
Multi-purpose. Isolated close fire systems must avoid unnecessary overspecialization.
Single purpose missile systems, such as the LOSAT, which
serves only to put a kinetic energy dart through a heavy main battle tank, must
be avoided as their usefulness depends on the presence of a specific target.
Instead, close fire missile systems should have multifunction warheads or
employ a common launcher to fire a family of missiles. Many simpler and
proven systems achieve the multi-purpose effect already: Tank cannons can
fire HESH, HEAT, Sabot, and Canister; the TOW can fire top-attack antiarmour
or bunker buster missiles; and the LAV III can fire Sabot, Frang, and
HEI-T. The key to multi-purpose is a weapon compatible with a family of
ammunition and a basic load that can be mission tailored.
Multi-means. “Using a combination of weapon systems to complicate the
opponent’s response is always desirable.” 33 To provide redundancy against
the enemy developing a protection against effects our forces wish to achieve,
close fire must have multiple means of achieving an effect. In a simple form,
a mixture of kinetic and chemical energy weapons provides multi-means for
the destruction of armour. However, multi-means also includes ensuring the
ability to engage LOS, NLOS and BLOS in order to engage both the enemy
that is exposed and enemy that is using ground for protection from fire;
complete close fire systems will include a mix of delivery means to allow
flexibility when differing ranges and obstacles to fire are encountered. Multimeans
requires the enemy to adopt TTPs and equipment to protect against all
our means of engagement. Failing this, the enemy will be forced to accept risk
in weaknesses that we can then exploit.
Stand-off. When possible, close fire systems will allow the destruction of the
enemy at ranges too far for reactionary fire. At its simplest, this is analogous
to using LAV cannon fire destroying platoons of Taliban in the open while the
Taliban are unable to respond with their man-portable weapons. Stand-off
also includes reaching around and behind obstacles to destroy the enemy.
Thus, a complete close fire capability will allow a manoeuvre unit to decisively
engage the enemy not only to the next ridge line, but also beyond the next
ridge line and around the corner.
Fit for the bayonet charge. While close fire attempts to improve survivability
by destroying the enemy at ranges too far for reactionary fire, it must be
recognized that a final up-close and intimate moment may be required to
confirm or complete the destruction. Further, in the battlespace of today and
the future there is no place of guaranteed security. Therefore, every close fire
system must be fit to participate in the assault and to fight through an ambush.
Network Enabled. The integration with a mobile battlefield network system
(MBNS) is one of the most critical elements of the close fire capability. As not
all weapon systems achieve all possible target effects, a MBNS will enable any
sensor to immediately queue an appropriate weapon onto a target. This would
be like adding a hunter-killer sight capability which is external to the individual
fighting platform. It is this component which will extend the reach of close fire
to allow the rapid and aggressive engagement of enemy outside the line of
sight.
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
71