The Canadian Army Journal

offensive capability would be required to take the offensive against Germany; and that
paratroops were useful for homeland defence. These arguments however met with little
success. 29
General McNaughton, the Canadian overseas commander, believed that creating
specialized forces without a credible role was a waste of valuable resources that Canada
could not afford. Despite the initial setbacks, the idea was taking root in Britain and the
U.S., and consequently attracted attention in Canada. By early 1942, the Minister of
National Defence (MND) was advocating training paratroopers but not forming a unit,
and the Director of Military Training was investigating training in the U.S. and gathering
information about the 6th British Airborne Division (6th Brit AB Div). Finally, a proposal
tabled to the MND in June 1942 for the formation of a parachute battalion was approved
by the Cabinet War Committee on 1 July 1942. 30
The 1st Cdn Para Bn was born with a stated role of home defence, to provide a
means of recapturing airports or reinforcing remote locations by airborne troops. This
role, however, was never fulfilled by the newly formed unit. The unit sought aggressive
recruits who were required to join the Canadian Active Service Force (enabling them to
serve overseas) before they could join 1st Cdn Para Bn. There was thus no doubt from
the outset that these soldiers were being prepared to fight overseas. Before the unit had
been fully trained it was offered to the British and alerted for overseas duty. 31 The
inconsistency between the publicly stated role of Canadian parachute troops and the
eventual employment of the unit with the British provides the first example in a long
history of inconsistent roles and conflicting military and political motives associated with
airborne forces in Canada.
The real motive of the Canadian military supporters of parachute capability was to
be part of British and American efforts to use modern airborne forces for large scale
offensive actions in Europe. Opponents argued that paratroopers were not required for
homeland defence; valuable resources should be used to further contributions to the war
effort that could be nationally controlled. Professor Horn described this inconsistency as
follows:
[T]he ultimate aim was never to develop the airborne capability for use in the
country’s defence. That was merely a sop to sidetrack opponents and gain
supporters. The advocates wanted to use the paratroops in the active theatres
of Europe. Indeed, airborne forces had become a symbol of modern warfare. 32
Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008
Combat camera IS2005-0168
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