The Canadian Army Journal
The Canadian Army Journal
The Canadian Army Journal
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Background<br />
Dr Lindsey’s interest in OR had its origins in the Second World War, and was<br />
derived from his personal experiences with the application of radar to air defence. 1 Many<br />
countries had started investigating electronic approaches to target detection well before<br />
the outbreak of war, but there were practical issues in getting it to be useful for the field. 2<br />
During the Second World War, radar was so secretive that its official title was known as<br />
‘electrical methods of fire control,’ and it was not discussed in public. 3 Although OR was<br />
strongly associated with air defence, it did not take long before many of its techniques<br />
were adopted for other applications in the army, navy and air force. <strong>The</strong> navy exploited<br />
the benefits of OR more quickly because of its technical flavour, and the fact that it<br />
collected and kept a lot of records, probably due to its isolation at sea. 4 Radar was soon<br />
used for fire control as well as detection of both ships and aircraft. <strong>The</strong> design and<br />
application of the radar equipment offered great opportunities for OR of a mathematical<br />
as well as experimental nature.<br />
One of the recurring challenges faced by the OR community was that of data<br />
availability. <strong>The</strong> nature of complex problems involving uncertainty, multiple stakeholders<br />
and conflicting goals frequently required preliminary studies even to get the data for tool<br />
development. In the 1930s and 40s, analysts did not have the luxury of time and had to<br />
make a best effort. Dr Lindsey recalled: “OR was always up against the challenge of<br />
accessing reliable information and records keeping. Even today, there are always<br />
changing players, numbers, rules and methods; what was practical in the 1940s was not<br />
applicable by the 1950s. When analysts had enough time to collect reliable data, we had<br />
to stop and ask ourselves—is it worth going further to obtain perfect information or will<br />
‘good enough’ suffice?” 5 <strong>The</strong> handicap of continuous evolution of the data that is needed<br />
for effective analysis of military problems irritated Dr Lindsey enough to redirect some of<br />
his research onto the strategy of baseball, a contest for which the rules never change,<br />
and for which there is a fervent collection and widespread distribution of statistics. 6<br />
<strong>Canadian</strong> <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Journal</strong> Vol. 11.1 Spring 2008