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410 GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS
of the Federal Constitution; that of 1861, on account of the secession
of the state from the Federal Union; that of 1865, 011 account of the
fall of the Confederacy and the necessity for obtaining readmission
into the Union; that of 1868, on account of the refusal of the Federal
Government to readmit the State under the Constitution of 1865, mak
ing the adoption of another Constitution a condition precedent; that of
1877, when the people of Georgia resumed control of their own affairs,
after the end of the Reconstruction era. The Constitution of 1798 and
the present Constitution are the only ones which represent a settled
condition of the state's organic law; the others represent temporary
conditions and transitional periods. In many respects the Constitution
of 1798 was the greatest of all the Constitutions which the state has
had. It gave fuller force and power to the executive and judicial
departments of the government than the earlier Constitutions and
restricted the legislative branch far less than the later ones. * * *
The Constitution of 1798 remained of force as the fundamental law of
the state for sixty-three years—nearly one-half the entire period of
the state's life—and was then repealed only because it was necessary
to create a new government. ,
When the first Legislature met after the adoption of this new Con
stitution an important legal reform was instituted in which Georgia led
all the other states of the Union. In what is known as the great Judici
ary Act of 1799 the General Asesmbly abolished special pleading, thus
greatly simplifying court procedure and emancipating justice from
many of the complicated technicalities and impediments of the English
law. There are comparatively few states which have not since followed
Georgia's example. But in an effort to establish a Supreme Court by
statute the Judiciary Act of 1799 was less successful. It provided that
the judges should meet annually at the seat of government for the
purpose of making rules and while thus in convention they were re
quired to settle such points as were reserved for argument and which
required a uniform decision. But in 1801 this clause of the judiciary
act was repealed. All points reserved for argument by the judges in
convention at the seat of government were remanded back to the coun
ties from which they had come, to be decided by the presiding judge.
For reasons to be given later, Georgia possessed a deep-seated prejudice
against a Supreme Court, nor was it until 1845—nearly half a century
later—that her repugnance to such an establishment was finally over
come.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1799 Georgia was divided into three
superior court circuits: the Eastern, the Middle and the Western. To
each of these circuits eight counties were assigned. David B. Mitchell
was elected judge of the Eastern Circuit; George Walton, judge of the
Middle Circuit; and Thomas P. Carnes, judge of the Western Circuit.
Two of these circuits had been in existence since the adoption of the
State Constitution of 1789: the Eastern and the Western, the judges of
which were to alternate in holding court. During this period the judges
of these two courts were as follows: George Walton, 1790-1792; Henry
Osborne, 1790-1791; John Houstoun, 1792-1796; William Stith, 1793-
1793; George Walton, 1793-1796; William Stevens, 1797-1798; John
Glen, 1798-1798; Thomas P. Carnes, 1797-1798.