John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections

stion: of l?yine- down, side "by
every -proposition, the rmm t p rr>rn nr> s 1 1, ^ rm -
Following this cue, Mill 1
s d f irst assumr>- \
tion is, that an opinion authoritatively I ki f*
"be suppressed ropy possibly true; and the /
"Jjlu
thirty
t>aes devoted to this -position show^-K"
a combination of reasoning and eloouence
that has never "been snrnpssed, if indeed
ever equalled.- in the cause of intellectual
freedom. Ther Second assumption is that an
opinion is false. "Here his argument takes
the more exclusive form of showing the
necessity of keeping in the view the
opposite of every opinion, in order to
maintain the living force of the opinion
itself. While there is much that is
effective here also, I think that he lays
too great stress upon the operation of
negative criticism in keeping alive the 1r
understanding of a doctrine. It is
perfectly true that when an opinion is
actively opposed, its defenders are put
on the qui vive in its defence; and have,
in consequence, a far more lively sense of
its truth, as well as a juster view of its
meaning and import: yet the necessity of
keeping up imaginary opponents to every
truth in science may easily be exaggerated.
We need not conjure up disbelievers in n^
gravitation so long as a hundred observ ^f\
atories and a hundred thousand ships are vK
constantly at work testing its consequences. )
When he_j)roaeeds to illustrate the en
livening influence of negation by the case
of ethical and religious doctrines, I think
he fails to make out his case, it may be
true enough that when a creed is first
,