John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections
John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections
John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections
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146 PRETENSIONS TO ORIGINALITY. 1849-1872.<br />
that even if they were errors there might be a substratum of<br />
truth underneath them, and that in any case the discovery of<br />
what it was that made them plausible, would be a benefit to<br />
truth." The parenthesis is truly remarkable. A man is to<br />
think humbly of himself as an original thinker, provided his<br />
originality does not extend beyond Logic, Metaphysics, and<br />
Social ! Philosophy How many more subjects would have been<br />
necessary to establish the claim ? One would naturally suppose<br />
the point to be, how much did he do in these three domains ?<br />
If he did everything that many of us are willing to give him<br />
credit for, he was an original thinker, and had few superiors,<br />
and not many equals. Willingness to learn is a very good<br />
thing, and was a part<br />
of his merits and a condition of his<br />
success ; but it is not under all circumstances necessary to<br />
original thinking, and certainly<br />
would not of itself constitute<br />
originality. Unless there be decided innate force, an over-<br />
susceptibility to other people s views rather extinguishes than<br />
promotes invention. Had <strong>Mill</strong> been less disposed to learn and<br />
unlearn, he must, <strong>with</strong> his powers of mind, have been still an<br />
original thinker, although in a somewhat different way. He<br />
himself contributes a curious and interesting illustration of this<br />
very point. To my mind, the best piece of work that he ever<br />
did, was the Third Book of the Logic Induction. Now, he<br />
tells us how fortunate he was in having finished this Book<br />
before reading Comte. That is to say, unassisted invention<br />
gave a better result than he would have attained by taking<br />
Comte into partnership from the beginning.<br />
I must still farther qualify <strong>Mill</strong> s claim to receptiveness,<br />
by adverting again to what I consider his greatest theoretical<br />
errors as a scientific thinker. The first is his doctrine of the<br />
natural equality of men. On this subject he was, in my<br />
opinion, blind to a whole region<br />
of facts. He inherited the<br />
mistake from his father, and could neither learn nor unlearn,<br />
in regard to it. The other error was perhaps less to be won<br />
dered at ; I mean the disregard of the physical conditions of